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Egypt’s Desert Paradoxes, Promises, And Possibilities:
A Study of Land Reclamation Policies along Cairo-Alexandria Desert Road

Abstract
In 2016 ‘People’s Right’ campaign, also known as the National Committee for Retrieving
Looted State Lands, was assigned to either retrieve or facilitate the formal registration of state
lands according to occupants’ personal cases. This study explores the official representations of
desert land reclamation, allocation, and distribution, with a focus on the (re-) conceptualization
of rights, state territoriality, and sovereignty as a part of an emerging national narrative on state
lands and property rights. The study draws on methodological insights in the anthropology of
development which employs a Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine ‘development’ and the
role of the state under neoliberalism. Through the lens of an unregistered settlement, Ard Baza,
the study puts national narratives of desert development and property rights in conversation with
individual cases to explore both property and state/society relations. In this framework, I
examine several sources including state publications, presidential speeches, newspapers’
archives, and official publications between 1952 and 2011. I also explore the history of Ard Baza
between 1989 and 2016 through semi-structured interviews with occupants, a sample of land
contracts, and other legal documents.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. vii
TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................... viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................. ix
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1
A- The Question of Mūwāt / Desert State Lands ....................................................2
1. Research Focus and Questions...............................................................6
2. Area of Study/ Ard Baza ........................................................................7
B- Review of Literature ..........................................................................................8
1. Scholarship on Egypt’s Desert Reclamation..........................................9
2. Land Titling: Global/ Local Anecdotes and Reflections .....................15
C- Theoretical Debates and Considerations ..........................................................20
1. Tenure Security, Property Rights, and Capital Accumulation .............20
a. Encountering the State ...................................................................22
2. Collective Resource Management and Resistance ..............................24
D- Methodology ....................................................................................................25
1. Discourse Analysis/ Post-Development ...............................................27
2. Case Study ...........................................................................................30
3. Limitations ...........................................................................................31
E- The Structure of the Study ...............................................................................32
CHAPTER II- CONTEXTUALIZING THE HISTORY OF EGYPT’S DESERT
DEVELOPMENT: RECLAMATION POLICIES AND DISCOURSE(S) ..................... 33
A- ‘The Land is Ours’ ...........................................................................................34
1. Land Reform: Collective/ Individual Models ......................................35
B- Re-Defining the Rule of Law and Social Justice .............................................42
1. Open Door Policy ................................................................................44
C- ‘Land to the Tiller’: A Growing ‘Informal Sector’ ..........................................49
D- Conclusion: Post-2011/ Informal Encroachments ...........................................52
iv

CHAPTER III- THE CASE OF ARD BAZA ....................................................................54
A- Contextualizing the History of Ard Baza .........................................................55
1. A Chain of Titles: Land Transaction(s) and Development ..................56
a. The Termination of Baza’s Contract ............................................59
B- Bedouins, Security, Exclusivity, and the Absence of Common Spaces ..........63
C- Resource Management and Networks: Macro/ Micro Management ...............64
1. Water ..................................................................................................64
2. Electricity ...........................................................................................66
D- Conclusion .......................................................................................................67
CHAPTER IV- DISPOSSESSION AND NARRATIVES OF OWNERSHIP .................69
A- Personal Networks and Encounters .................................................................71
B- Individual Cases ...............................................................................................72
1. Case One ..............................................................................................72
2. Case Two .............................................................................................73
3. Case Three ...........................................................................................73
4. Case Four .............................................................................................74
5. Case Five ..............................................................................................75
6. Case Six ...............................................................................................76
7. Case Seven ...........................................................................................76
8. Case Eight ............................................................................................77
9. Case Nine .............................................................................................77
10. Case Ten...............................................................................................78
C- Registering a Desert Land ................................................................................79

v

D- Conclusion .......................................................................................................80
CHAPTER V- CONCLUSION .........................................................................................82
A- A Policy Mess: Chaos or ‘Accumulation by Dispossession? ..........................82
B- Resistance and Law..........................................................................................85
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................88
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................90

vi

Acknowledgements
This research project was conducted under a fellowship granted by the American
University in Cairo. It is a product of two years of hard work and what seemed to be an eternal
nightmare, the nightmare did not emerge from the stress that this work has put me through, but
from the stress of forcing myself to document my own compromised security as I faced the threat
of eviction and the demolishment of my house. In this process, I have learned that being a part of
the academic ‘ivory tower,’ a local subject, and a researcher is very empowering as one
possesses the tools to connect their experiences to a broader network of knowledge. The tools
and skills to which I owe the production of this work would not have been possible without the
assistance of my professors and colleagues at AUC. I would like to express my deepest gratitude
to Dr. Sandrine Gamblin and Dr. Mona Abaza who have generously provided me with the help I
needed and assisted me throughout the various stages of my research. My gratitude also extends
to my second reader Dr. Robert Mason and Dr. Sherene Seikaly for their support and muchvalued assistance. I’m also grateful to Radwa Wassim and Hany Luke at the Middle East
Studies Center.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my family, Iman El-Gazzar and Yehia
Salman for their support. Finally, informants at Ard Baza, who have taken time out of their daily
schedules to meet with me and thoroughly explain to me their cases.

vii

Transliterations and Abbreviations
Note on Transliteration
This study employs Brill’s simplified transliteration system, to give the reader an idea on the
Arabic words, related to land issues and resource management, that are used in legal documents,
media, and in daily conversations.
Abbreviations
AUC

The American University in Cairo

DDC

Desert Development Centre

EARIS

Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service

EAUDRL

Egyptian Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Lands

ESA

The Egyptian Survey Authority

GARPAD

General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development

GIZ/ GTZ

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

GOPP

General Organization for Physical Planning

NUC

New Urban Communities

HCAR

Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform

UAR

United Arab Republic

UN

United Nations

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

viii

List of Illustrations
Figures
1.1 The ruins of a demolished shop at Ard Baza, October 2016.
1.2 The logo of the ‘People’s Right’ campaign.
2.1 A congratulatory note in Al-Ahram newspaper for the sixth anniversary of the 23rd of July
revolution.
2.2 Headline, Al-Ahram, 2 July 1958.
2.3 Headline, Al-Ahram, 11 July 1958.
2.4 Headline, The New York Times, 13 March 1962.
2.5 Headline, Al-Ahram, 22 May 1961.
2.6 Headline, The New York Times, 2 January 1972.
2.7 Two caricatures by Egyptian poet and cartoonist Salah Jahin, Al-Ahram, 1969 and 1972.
2.8 Headline, The New York Times, 18 October 1979.
2.9 Presidential Decree No. 123 of 1978.
2.10. Headline, Al-Ahrar newspaper, 23 January 1997.
2.11. Headline, Al-Akhbar newspaper, 4 June 1997.
2.12. News article, Nahdet Misr newspaper, 21 May 2011.
3.1. Sadat City and Ard Baza on Cairo-Alexandria desert road.
3.2. Ard Baza, 2004 and 2016.
3.3. A settler’s handwritten comments on the land registration process.
3.4. Three pictures that shows boundaries and gates, Ard Baza.

ix

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Figure 1.1 The ruins of a demolished shop, Ard Baza, 2016 (Photographed by author).

A wave of demolition and confiscation orders targeting extra-legal structures has been
taking the lands of Egypt by storm. Under the banner of ‘People`s Right’; a committee
responsible for retrieving looted state lands was established in February 2016 to mediate between
squatters and state institutions, ǧehāt elwelāyāh. On 29 May 2016, the settlers of Ard Baza1
waited anxiously in a packed storeroom, a few meters away from the service road parallel to
Cairo-Alexandria desert highway, for the ‘People’s Right’ Committee representative to arrive.
Plot-owners, who were obviously meeting for the first time, discussed their disputes against the
land broker, Baza, over services and fraudulent contracts. A few hours later, the representative

1

An unregistered area that covers 215 feddans and lies a few meters west Cairo-Alexandria desert road, the area is
known as Ard Baza, or Baza’s land. Baza is the original land broker who still manages the settlement.

1

arrived, greeted the settlers and explained briefly the method through which they can apply for
reconciliation with the state.
The sounds of police cars sirens getting louder drew the settlers’ attention to the military
and police forces approaching the gate of the settlement, and within seconds settlers were
moving their cars in front of their property to block the passage of the forces. On the top of a
military tank were the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun Police Station and a representative from
the General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development, GARPAD.2 The
GARPAD official who claimed ownership of the land led the forces to demolish unpermitted
buildings. Stopped by the committee’s representative, the two state representatives argued over
whether the settlement should be demolished. Finally, the committee’s officer climbed up a
police jeep leading military tanks and bulldozers to Baza`s two-story house and an abandoned
building on the entryway of the settlement that was both doomed to demolition.
The Question of Mūwāt / Desert State Lands
In his speech during the inauguration of several projects in the governorate of Qena,
President Al-Sisi urged the police and the military to end illegal land acquisition . . . The
President criticized the performance of the government urging it to improve and
forcefully settle the legal status of land taken by force from the state.
Egypt Daily News, 31 May 2017.3

2

The state authority to which state land are allocated.
El-Said, Mohammad. “Properties Demolished, Land Retrieved in State Anti-Encroachment Campaign.” Egypt
Daily News, 31 May 2017.
3

2

On 9 February 2016, the President of Egypt issued Decree No. 75, to establish The
National Committee for Retrieving Looted State Lands under the presidency of Ibrahim
Mehleb,4 president’s advisor for national projects and former Prime Minister. The decree
assigned the committee to calculate and recover unlawfully seized state lands; collect state dues
and coordinate with authorities to retrieve looted lands; prepare reports of
land grab cases; and transfer cases of looting state lands to national
investigation bodies.5 Another Presidential Decree issued on 24 August
2017, announced that the recommendations of the committee are
obligatory to all-state authorities.6

Figure 1.2. The logo of
“People’s Right” committee.
Source: People’s Right
Committee website. (See
Works Cited).

The Egyptian state has maintained a monopoly over lands, namely
desert lands, from as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7 The ambiguity of both
the right of individuals to own desert lands and that of the state in Egypt’s property law has led
to several disputes between the state and members of the society.8 A recent research by the
Egyptian Center for Policy Studies notes that ninety-six percent of Egypt’s lands are categorized
as desert lands that are directly owned by the state, most of which are informally occupied.9 The
specificity of desert lands emerges from its unique position in the Egyptian Property Law,
customary law, and the official development narrative which separates it from other types of
lands. David Sims lists four categories of lands, (1) public-domain lands including military
lands; (2) state private-domain lands, ʾAmlāk ʾamiriyāh; (3) private lands; (4) religious trust lands

4

Under the presidency of both Adly Mansour and el-Sisi Mehleb served as prime minister for the interim
government in 2013 and in 2014, minister of housing 2013, he was also a member of the Policies Committee at the
National Democratic Party prior to 2011.
5
People’s Right website 2017.
6
People’s Right website 2017.
7
Baer, Gabriel. A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800-1950. Oxford University Press, 1962, p.2.
8
Ibid.
9
Mahmoud Farouk “ تحليل الوضع القانونى والسياسى واالثر اإلقتصادى:( ``الوصول إلى االرض فى مصرAn Analysis of the Legal,
Political and Economic Aspects of Accessing Lands in Egypt).” The Egyptian Centre for Policy Studies, 2015, p. 8.
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or waqf.10 In a report published in 2008 on “Landownership Disputes in Egypt— A Case Study
on the Tensions Around the Monastery of Aby Fana in May 2008,” the authors defines six
categories of state lands among which are, (1) lands of strategic importance; (2) lands within a
state-reclamation plan; (3) lands appropriated for the Ministry of Housing under the New Urban
Societies’ authority; (4) touristic areas; (5) lands for agricultural development (inside
governorates’ administrative borders); (6) lands outside of governorates’ administrative
borders.11 Desert lands, in the Egyptian context, are state lands that extend outside of
governorates’ borders.12 According to Richard A. Debs in Islamic Law and Civil Code: The Law
of Property in Egypt, such categorization is driven from Sharia, he states that:
The only category of state-owned land that is separately treated in the Civil Code and that
is traceable to traditional Islamic law is uncultivated land that has no owner and that may
be acquired pursuant to the rules on appropriation. These lands apparently continue to be
treated as a separate category of state-owned land distinct from either the private domain
or the public domain. They are in effect, the (mūwāt) lands of Islamic law.”13
Along similar lines, Sims illustrates that “absent from all of these laws [public/ state lands laws]
is the uplifting phrase, so common in similar legislation in other countries, that the public land is
an asset that belongs to the people and is ‘held in trust’ by the state for the benefit of these
people.”14 The way in which Egypt’s property law deals with the possession of desert state lands
is still ambiguous and put desert dwellers in a precarious situation where they’re continuously

Sims, David E. Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? Cairo: The American University in Cairo
Press, 2014, p. 265.
11
Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. “Landownership Disputes in Egypt: A Case Study of the Tension around the
Monastery of Abū Fānā in May 2008.” Arab West Report, 2008, p.21.
12
Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. 21.
13
Debs 136; Egypt’s Civil Code of 1949, to which Debs refer to in his study, still regulates property and contractual
rights in Egypt.
14
Ibid, p.264.
10
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haunted by the threat of eviction and demolition. The status of wad’ yadd, a process where
individuals can gain ownership over a desert land through cultivation and peaceful occupation, is
one dimension of this ambiguity that adds to an incoherent legal landscape in treating desert
properties and state lands in general.15 Gabriel Baer posits that the main distinction between state
property and public property is that “ownership of the former may be transferred to individuals;
ownership of the latter may not.”16
The transaction of lands from the state domain to the private domain is appropriated
through both formal registration and customary land ownership, in “Landownership Disputes in
Egypt,” the authors define two customary methods through which individuals claim desert state
lands either through unregistered ‘urfi contracts between two parties outside of the formal
registration system or through wad ‘yadd “(…) the seizure of a piece of land without any legal
documents.”17 However, the distinction between formal land registration and customary land
ownership in Egypt’s property law, especially in the case of state lands (agricultural and desert),
is more complicated in both Egypt’s property/legal discourse and in practice, for instance, Sims
illustrates that the system under which the acquisition of uncultivated lands is regulated in the
Civil Code have led to a ‘legal problem,’ “one part of the code recognizes the right to claim
(through wad‘ al-yadd) unused land and cultivate it and, after a period of fifteen years of
peaceful, unchallenged, and uninterrupted possession gain ownership . . . elsewhere in the code
[,] it states that such a right does not apply to state lands.”18 In this framework, two main laws

In Emad El-Din Abu El-Ghazaly’s ) زمن المماليك الجراكسة (دراسة فى بيع امالك بيت المال:( تطور الحيازة الزراعيةThe Evolution
of Agricultural Tenancy: The Circassian Mamluks Period (A Study on Selling Bayt al-Mal)). Ein for Human and
Social Studies, 2000. He analyses the transferal of state property to individuals in Egypt under the Mamluks, who
had a monopoly over lands that were mostly held under iltizam, where multazim middlemen were responsible for
collecting taxes from Egyptian peasants, such transactions took place at times of crisis and acted as a source of fast
revenue to the state in times of war and economic crisis e.g. Qaitbay military campaigns.
16
Baer 196.
17
Johannsen, Asger Toft, et al. 7.
18
Sims 265
15
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regulate individuals’ access to desert state lands, The Desert Lands Law of 1981 and State
Private Property Law, modified in 2017.
Research Focus and Questions
This study draws on theories of discourse to explore official representations of state/
desert land reclamation, allocation, and distribution, with a focus on the (re-) conceptualization
of land rights, state territoriality, and sovereignty as a part of an emerging national narrative on
state lands and property rights. Through the lens of an unregistered settlement, the study puts
national narratives of desert development and property rights in conversation with individual
cases to explore property relations and state/society relations. I examine two sets of sources
including state publications, presidential speeches, archives of official newspapers’ publications
between 1952 and 2011; then shift the focus of the narrative to the history of Ard Baza between
1989 and 2016; I also go through a sample of land contracts between state institutions and
settlers and legal documents related to land ownership disputes. The study draws on
methodological insights in the anthropology of development which employs a Foucauldian
discourse analysis to examine ‘development’ and the role of the state under neoliberalism. 19
The main argument of this study lies at the juncture of two views on inclusiveness which
are presented in David Harvey’s ‘Right to the City’ and debates on property rights as a part of a
national/ international legal discourse, it hypothesize that while non-hierarchical inclusiveness
can be attained in the presence of strong social movements, the current jeopardized situation of
Egypt’s social movements calls for alternative forms of resistance, in this framework, I argue
that such resistance should be directed towards re-investigating the right of the state to hold
19

This body of literature was developed by a number of anthropologists such as Akhil Gupta (1995, 1997); James
Ferguson (1990, 1997, 2011); and Arturo Escobar (2008, 2011); this study employs David Harvey’s definition of
neoliberalism as “(…) theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can be advanced by
the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms,” see, Harvey 2007.
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property under what comes to resemble a private property right. The study first examines
academic and theoretical debates on property rights and informality and links these debates to
Egypt’s desert lands, it then delves into earlier official representations of desert state lands’
distribution, finally, it examines representations of ownership, social networks, and patterns of
inclusion/ exclusion in an unregistered desert settlement.
The main questions that guide this research are how have the Egyptian state used and
portrayed secure property rights to encourage voluntary resettlement and investment in desert
lands? And, how do informal desert communities react to the retrieval of state lands? These two
questions lead to four main sub-questions, (1) What were the main shifts in the official narrative,
and how can these shifts be read in the broader economic and political framework? (2) How can
studying desert reclamation contribute to the general understanding of the dynamics of property
and state/society relations? Also, how can the case of Ard Baza contribute to the understanding
of such relations? (3) What are the legal and customary frameworks that regulate the right to
desert lands in Egypt? (4) How do legal agreements and local resource management influence
collective action and resistance in squatter and informal communities?
Area of Study/ Ard Baza
Ard Baza is a semi-formal settlement located on kilometer 91 from Cairo west of CairoAlexandria desert road, Baza, the original landowner and a retired public officer at Sadat City
Council, bought the land (215 feddans) in 1989 and have been selling small plots that range
between few meters to feddan since the 1990s. 20 Before Baza bought the land, it was allocated to
Sadat City Authority, under the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development, and in

20

One feddan is equal to 1.038 acres.
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2002 Ard Baza was transferred to The General Authority for Reclamation Projects and
Agricultural Development under the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. The
Ministry of Agriculture issued the first demolition order against Ard Baza in 2011, followed by
another in 2014, and after the establishment of the People’s Right Committee, a representative
from the committee arrived at Ard Baza to stop the demolition order. With a very small
population of about 20 resident families, Ard Baza does not provide much insight into the daily
struggle of squatter populations, however, with over 200 plot-holders, the case of Ard Baza is an
example of a growing form of investment by low-income and middle-income individuals in
semi-formal lands and desert reclamation activities. This project follows the process of
registering Ard Baza through the lens of individual cases to cast a light on broader contexts, such
as the dynamics of competition over property in Egypt, desert development narratives, policies,
and practices, state/society relationships, resource management and social networking in
informal areas.
Review of Literature
This part sketches and examines literature that constitutes the bulk of knowledge on
desert reclamation, distribution, global land deals, and land titling. In this framework, I examine
two relevant bodies of literature, literature on the history of Egypt’s desert reclamation and land
tenure and global debates on land titling and land deals. The first body of literature constitute the
bulk of knowledge to which this study contributes and it gives the reader an idea of previous
scholarly production on desert reclamation21 and distribution. The second body of literature on

This study uses D. Sims definition of desert reclamation as the “(…) development of arid areas for agriculture,
whether with Nile water or groundwater,” which is excerpted from national representations and the Islamic
definition of mūwāt lands, see, Sims 9.
21
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land titling and land deals connects local accounts of desert development to global debates on
land titling and land deals.
Scholarship on Egypt’s Desert Reclamation and Land Tenure Policy
Desert reclamation projects have inspired several ethnographic and socioeconomic
studies; the early significantly limited body of literature, produced between the 1950s and 80s,
contributed to what was then a growing body of literature on the redistribution of landed
property under land reforms.22 With the change in land reclamation policies and urban expansion
into the desert by the end of the 1980s, a shift towards critical analysis of urban neoliberalism
and desert informalities have developed.
In “Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy
for Reclaimed Lands” R. Springborg examines the political basis of tenure policies under Gamal
Abdel Nasser (1956-70) and Anwar Al-Sadat (1970-81) in a study that was published in 1979.23
Based on Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism, a form of government where the “(…) ruler’s
authority is personal-familial, and the mechanics of the household are the models for political
administration,”24 Springborg illustrates that “in the patrimonial state clientage networks
emanating downward from the ruler provide the organizational structure by which the state is
actually governed and through which challenges to the ruler arise.”25 He draws on several

For more on Land Reform in the Egyptian context, see, Reem Saad’s ethnography Social History of an Agrarian
Reform Community in Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1989.
23
Land tenure is the “(…) relationship, governed by law or custom, between people whether individuals or groups,
concerning lands,” see, Land Tenure Studies. "Land tenure and rural development." Land administration 3, 2002.
24
Adams, Julia. "The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe." Max Weber’s
Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, 2005, pp. 237-266.
25
Springborg, Robert. “Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy for
Reclaimed Lands.” Middle Eastern Studies 15.1, 1979, p. 49; In his other book Family, Power, and Politics in
Egypt: Sayed Bey Marei — his clans, clients, and cohorts Springborg analyzed the way through which political
elites, such as Marei, have maintained their social sovereignty and transferred into Nasser’s notability, see,
Springborg, Robert, Family, Power, and Politics in Egypt: Sayed Bey Marei — his clans, clients, and cohorts
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982, 10; also see Salman, Salwa, “Analysis of Egypt`s agrarian reform
22
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empirical evidence to illustrate and examine how elite networks are constructed to maintain the
ruler’s power; to do so, he examines a particular conflict between Magdi Hassanein, a Free
Officer who was responsible for the establishment of Tahrir Province, and Sayid Marei, the head
of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, over different models of land tenure, namely
collective vs. individual models. The two models were experimented in one among the first
reclamation projects, Tahrir Province. Springborg’s analysis offers several interesting insights on
the power of the ruler, in contrast to the state as an abstract entity, however, it overstates the
individual power of the ruler while overlooking other institutional and global dimensions that
have contributed to shaping Egypt’s land tenure policy.
A study that The Desert Development Centre (DDC), a non-profit research institution
established by the American University in Cairo in 1979, draws on the Soviet and the American
initiatives to implement different land distribution and tenure models in different areas in Tahrir
Province. This, along with the conflict between Marei and Hassanein resulted in a shift between
the two distribution models.26 They note that:
In South Tahrir, the initial debate was between state farms or collective on the one hand,
and the smallholder/cooperative model on the other hand . . . In Egypt as a whole, South
Tahrir came to represent the state farm model, as opposed to the smallholder model being

and the changing structure of land ownership, 1952-1961.” Working Paper, 2014, p. 9.
26
Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al, Participation and Community in the Egyptian New Lands: The Case of South Tahrir.
Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1988, 6; The authors examined the history of Egypt’s desert development
through the lens of the South Tahrir and the perspectives of its’ settlers based on “an analysis of the discourse
presented in [their] notes,” 26 their research which was primarily focused on the political participation of the new
community notes several problems that hinder the maturity of these new communities, among which are the shift in
land distribution policies, the lack of supply and services, and the absence of ‘local government institutions.’
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realized with American assistance [through the Egyptian-American Rural Service] in
Abis and elsewhere.27
In another study, published in 1977, H. Tadros evaluates reclamation and resettlement process in
new desert projects, he conducted his research in two types of settlements, that he classified
according to land tenancy, fully-owned and leased plots in the reclamation projects located in the
North-western Nile Delta.28 Based on household surveys, interviews with settlers and
administrators, along with analyses of governmental statistical data, he concludes that “ settlers
were wholeheartedly in favor of land ownership; in addition to the higher prestige which it
conveys, land ownership gives feelings of security . . . this is not the case with the tenants, who
are constantly haunted by the idea that one day they might lose both their land and their houses,
for one resource or another.”29 Springborg illustrates that even though Nasser’s administration
claimed to give land back to the people, in 1962 Nasser’s personal secretary, Major Kamal El
Hennawi, proclaimed to Rose Al Youssef weekly that “ experience has demonstrated that the
distribution of agrarian reform land to the peasant and of houses to certain members of the
cooperative associations has alienated them from the socialist spirit,”30 accordingly, Springborg
illustrates that in 1964 the Egyptian government stopped granting titles to small-holders.31
A shift from agricultural to urban expansion into the desert was already taking place
during the 1970s, however, the first reflections on such changes became a subject of academic
inquiry and theorization years later. Desert transformation’s rhetoric shifted from the

27

Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al, 6.
The study was carried out between 1971 and 1975 under the supervision of the AUC’s Social Research centre, in
cooperation with the Egyptian General Organization for land Cultivation and Development.
29
Tadros, Helmi R. Rural Resettlement in Egypt’s Reclaimed Lands: An Evaluation of a Case Study in the
Northwestern Nile Delta. Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1978. Print. Cairo Papers in Social Science v. 1,
monograph, p. 18.
30
“Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt” 58.
31
Hopkins, Nicholas S. et al. 12.
28
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empowerment of peasantry to safeguarding low-income urban dwellers, thus initiating new plans
for subsidized housing units and the construction of new satellite cities.32 The ‘invasion of the
desert’ as well as ‘desert development’ were primary mission for the Egyptian state in the 6th of
October Working Paper,33 this invasion entailed the use of desert lands for urban expansion.34 M.
Batran and C. Arandel note that:
by 1980, the formulation of a new master plan became imperative because demographic
growth had again been underestimated and the satellite cities were not ready to absorb the
excess population. The objectives of the new master plan were to redefine the urban
strategy, to make essential choices regarding investment in urban projects.35
The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program in the early 1990s and the 2005
neoliberal reforms, introduced new patterns of exclusion and spatial segregation between social
classes influencing both urban and rural dwellers,36 and especially manifested in desert gated
communities;37 T. Mitchell points out that:
The development tracts spreading out across the fields and deserts around Greater Cairo
represent the most phenomenal real estate explosion Egypt has ever witnessed. No one
has mapped what is happening, but a conservative estimate is that within less than five
years the area of its capital city has doubled.38
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Since the 1990s, government’s long support for state-led mega-reclamation projects have now
been replaced with new policies that encourages commercial farming and fund-oriented
projects,39 except for few projects such as Mubarak’s reclamation project established in 1986 on
the western side of the Nile Delta and funded by the World Food Programme, Denmark’s
development cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Denmark (Danida), and the
European Union.40 Hanne K. Adriansen places the economic and social aspects of resettlement in
Mubarak’s project within the broader history of Egypt’s desert reclamation and policies of
distribution.41 The project was designed to absorb new graduates, the surplus young labor force
after the government abandoned its employment guarantee policy, and in 1997 landless farmers
who have lost their lands after the enactment of the Tenancy Law of 1992 joined graduates in
Mubarak’s project.42
Whilst the previously mentioned studies have employed an ethnographic lens to analyse
the socioeconomic aspects of Egypt’s desert reclamation, I would like to conclude this part by
presenting two of the most important studies for the context of my research, David Sims’s
Egypt’s Desert Dreams, published in 2015; and Jessica Barner’s “Pumping possibility:
Agricultural expansion through desert reclamation in Egypt,” in 2012.
Sims’s book gives a comprehensive and detailed account of desert development based on
case studies, statistical data, maps, historical texts, with a limited attempt to draw a theoretical
map to desert development in general, however, as an urbanist and advisor for national
institutions and international donor providers on issues of housing, urban, and desert
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development, Sims provided an insider’s analysis of desert development projects. 43 He divides
reclamation projects into three types, government-led; independent or state lands that are
allocated to cooperatives, individuals, and companies; and squatter reclamation wad ‘yadd. In the
last chapter of his book, Sims portrays the legal and institutional framework that governs desert
lands; he points out to the absence of ‘unified mapping’ and the ‘overlapping jurisdictions’ as
two main obstacles to desert development.
On the other hand, J. Barners’s field-based study in two reclamation sites in West Nile
Delta and Fayoum to examine the emergence of social and economic networks in new desert
communities around water pumps, basing her analysis on actor-network theory to study the role
of water pumps as an actor in the process of building communities; she highlights that by
monopolizing the flow of water from one field to another the government uses water supply ; as
an example, she highlights that in March 2007, the Egyptian government sent a project appraisal
document to the World Bank`s board requesting a fund of US $300 million to support the West
Delta Irrigation Rehabilitation Project.44 The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation had
launched the project in December 2000 to divert water from Rayah al-Nasseri canal, located at
km 7.0 from the Nubariya canal, through high pressure pumps to the Western Desert.45 And in an
interview with one of the government`s officials responsible for the execution of the project,
Barners notes that when she asked him about the possibility of damage the project can cause
through diverting water to the desert, his answer was simply ‘let the Delta die’.46
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Both authors have followed different approaches in collecting data and interpretation,
their works sketch the web of social and political networks that emerge within and around new
desert communities and go beyond traditional readings of desert development; whilst Sims
outlines mostly quantitative data that has not been presented before, at least in English written
scholarship; Barnes makes very interesting reflections on the role of water pumps in shaping
social relations among new communities. Bruno Latour portrays ‘socio-technical assemblages’
as follows “take any object, at first it looks containing to itself with (well-delineated) edges and
limit, then something happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe and suddenly you discover a
swarm of entity that seem to have been there all along but was not visible before,”47 this
portrayal offers very interesting insights on how objects such as water pumps and electric power
transformers play an important role in the construction of social relations/ power relations among
members of new communities.
Land Deals and Land Titling: Global/ Local Anecdotes and Reflections
Families would stake out a piece of land and, usually relying on lift pumps and channels
from the nearest canal or other water source, would try to grow either crops or fruit trees
[this process is known as wad ‘yadd] . . . In 2010 government officials put the amount of
desert land under wad ‘yadd cultivation at “at least one million feddans.”
— D. Sims, 2015.48
Former Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mehleb, invited Hernando de Soto, Peruvian
development economist and President of the nongovernmental Institute of Liberty and
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Democracy (ILD), to discuss the possibility of reforming Egypt`s property system and retain the
value of a growing informal property sector in January 2015. 49 Earlier in 1997, de Soto
published a study in cooperation with The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies on “Dead
Capital and the Poor in Egypt” where they estimated an average loss of 241 billion US dollars in
rural, urban and desert informal sectors dead capital 50 mainly due to the high cost and
complexity of land registration, a process that requires more than seventy-seven ‘bureaucratic
procedures’ during the span of six to fourteen years.51 He proclaims that “(…) the problem that
Egyptians will face is that most property in the informal sector cannot be documented and
permanently inserted into the legal and global market economy by traditional titling, registration,
surveying, mapping and privatization approaches.”52 De Soto lists six steps towards reforming
Egypt’s property registration system that start with (1) identifying the main challenges to formal
registration and collecting information on the informal property market; (2) implementing an
administrative and institutional reform strategy; (3) ‘collect proofs of ownership’; (4)
establishing a ‘communication strategy’ to raise awareness among informal communities; (5)
developing the ‘registry, surveying, and , mapping technologies’; finally (6) integrating the
informal sector.53
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De Soto’s work has contributed to shaping market-led reform strategies in several
countries of the global south.54 As development economists and a long-term international adviser
to several ‘underdeveloped’ countries, he has been engaged in reform debates since 1997 under
Mubarak’s regime. In a talk at the proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, in 2013,
he describes the Arab Spring as a wave of entrepreneurial55 revolts and proclaims that “we [the
ILD] were hired by the Muslim Brotherhood to bring entrepreneurship to the poor in Egypt.”56 A
major critique of de Soto’s thesis is premised on his strong advocacy for the commodification of
property while overlooking patterns of exclusion that emerge from market-led reforms.57 Even
within market-oriented framework and line of thought, several researchers proved that the
formalization of the property will not lead to the increased access to credit and other financial
services, it also does not facilitate national land transactions. l: Land Tenure and Poverty in
Africa and the Caribbean, a collection of empirical-oriented studies that test de Soto’s thesis in a
local context, researchers58 highlight three key limitations to de Soto’s argument including the
“(…) role of colonial and postcolonial governments in constructing exclusion and illegality,”59
assuming that investment and access to property loans are the main scopes of poor property
holders, and underestimating state corruption as an obstacle to securing property rights.60
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R. Home and H. Lim posits that “the magic of property turns sand to gold is an aphorism
that aptly encapsulates the de Soto thesis and current policies of the World Bank, USAID (,) and
other aid agencies.”61 They portray de Soto’s thesis as a ‘magic bullet’ that has disturbed a long
silence over violations of security of land tenure and the precarious living conditions of
communities that exist on the margins of the legal system. However, the question that the authors
pose is whether land titling will secure tenure rights.
In 1986, the UN’s Declaration on the Right to Development defines the ‘right to
development’ as a social, economic and political progress of populations and as a primary human
right, where the mechanisms of integration and equal access to development are set and
governed by states. 62 The ‘right to development’ has been the basis for different UN campaigns
one of which is the right to ‘secure tenure’, adopted by the UN Centre for Human Settlement
Program in 1999, to help states set a legal framework to facilitate land registration and ensure a
secure base of rights to slum dwellers.63 Caroline Runkel examines the GTZ’s, German
Organization for Technical Cooperation, involvement in a titling project that aimed at legalizing
property in Manshiet Nasser64 in 2009; she closely examines three cases of land titling that took
place between 1976 and 1998, including, Helwan Housing and Community Upgrading project
(1976-1988), Hayy Al-Salam in Ismailia (1978-1983), and Nasriyya in Aswan (1987-1998).65
Runkel points out that squatters have generally shown a lack of interest in titling their property
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due to the lack of trust in the effectiveness of the titling process, “(…) does the government
really want to sell the land? Or is opening an ineffective titling process [,] a compromise that will
ostensibly welcome GTZ’s work and at the same time hold the government out of this risky
affair?”66
The extent to which land titling will guarantee security of land tenure is questionable,
however, in the light of a broader critical discussion on land deals67 in postcolonial countries,
several scholars have pointed out to land titling is a process through which a state reconfigures
its’ sovereignty, authority, and territoriality; Home asserts that “not only is the modern nationState partly defined by its territorial claims to sovereignty, but the construction and exercise of
State power takes place within this territory, giving spatial geography a heightened significance
in most of the State’s activities.”68 Hence, the regularization of access to land, power to allocate,
and to re-define rights become essential to state-building 69 in this context, “it was argued that
land grabs were happening in states where ‘governance of the land sector and tenure security are
weak,’70” 71 authors’ instead highlight state’s role in facilitating illegal occupation of lands for
the benefit of capital-induced projects rather than the benefit of locals.72
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At this juncture, the retrieval of state lands contest themes of development and
empowerment that have occupied official representations of desert reclamation and land
allocation since the enactment of the First Land Reform Bill in 1952. Both bodies of literature
do not expand on the concept of ownership from a legal and socioeconomic viewpoint, another
pitfall of the above-examined literature is its failure to illustrate the cultural aspect of ownership
and the specificity of the Egyptian local reclamation and land distribution experience, in this
framework, this study expands on the local aspect of desert reclamation, distribution, and the
concept of informality in Egypt.
Theoretical Debates and Considerations
Tenure Security, Property Rights, and Capital Accumulation
A great deal of energy is expended in promoting their significance [human rights] for the
construction of a better world. But for the most part (,) the concepts circulating do not
fundamentally challenge hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, or the dominant
modes of legality and state action.
— D. Harvey, 2008.73
David Harvey’s ‘Right to the City’ and Hernando de Soto’s thesis on Dead Capital are
two opposite takes on the concept of rights, while Harvey explores the right to public spaces and
inclusion in the urban process de Soto examines the right of low -income populations in secure
tenure, in other words, their right in private property. Following a Marxist interpretation of
capital accumulation, Harvey highlights the role of property market in surplus absorption and
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accumulation by dispossession,74 which is one of the basis of modern class struggle. While
Harvey argues that resistance for dispossession is a role to be carried out through collective
resistance, De Soto, on the other hand, analyses another form of dispossession that is based on
the absence of legal rights to assets that are occupied by the poor, which is in other words, the
absence of an inclusive property registration system, ‘property registration’.75De Soto portrays
the lack of property representations as follows, “imagine a country where nobody can identify
who owns what, addresses cannot be easily verified, people cannot be made to pay their debts,
resources cannot conveniently be turned into money, ownership cannot be divided through
documents.”76
As mentioned earlier, while de Soto emphasises on the importance of property
representation to secure low-income populations’ tenure rights and promotes as the right to
economic power through recognition and formalization of property, he premises his
rationalization of the formalization of property system is based on an advocacy for marketinduced reforms, which leads us back to accumulation by dispossession and the triumph of
radicalized capitalism, space modification, and unjust distribution of resources. Since property
debates are always used in a context where different political ideologies dominates its’
examination, in my own reading, while de Soto draws on an important aspect that is overlooked
in many critical analysis, which is people’s right to secure property, his analysis only advocates
for property registration for the purpose of the inclusion of low-income society in the capitalist
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machine, the commodification of resources, where new forms of accumulation by dispossession
emerge and develop.
Encountering the State
In 1927, Morris R. Cohen published a study on “Property and Sovereignty,” asserting that
“the distinction between property and sovereignty is generally identified with the Roman
discrimination between dominium, the rule over things by the individual, and imperium, the rule
overall individuals by the prince.”77 A modern reading of Cohen’s property/sovereignty divide
would put the reader in puzzlement, since the conceptualization of sovereignty has been
overcrowded by various interpretations of the role of the sovereign under neoliberalism,78 as well
as the role of the state under neoliberalism, the role of a state in Harvey’s interpretation is an
intermediator actor who coercively enforces ‘capitalist development’:
There is considerable evidence that the transition to capitalist development was and
continues to be vitally contingent upon the stance of the state. The developmental role of
the state goes back a long way, keeping the territorial and capitalistic logics of power
always intertwined though not necessarily concordant. 79
On private property, Iliya Harik states “the concept of private property makes sense in the
context of the state or some communal order with a structure of command,”80 however, how can
we analyze the relationship between sovereignty, property, and neoliberalism in the case of
state’s property? While there is a huge academic silence on communist, post-communist, and
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socialist countries’ system of state ownership, in the Egyptian case, populations are evicted in the
name of retrieving state property. In “Restructuring Socialist Ownership” Remanth N. Swamy
states:
State ownership, it may be recalled, has for long been considered to be the central pillar
of the traditional economy of the Soviet-type-in conjunction with centralised planning
and one -party dominance, these three features were canonised in the tortuous evolution
of the body of doctrine which until recently went under the name of the ‘political
economy of socialism.81
Another reading of the place of state property under neoliberalism is excerpted from James
Ferguson’s analysis of neoliberalism as a regime of political and economic practices that “puts
governmental mechanisms developed in the private sphere to work within the state itself, so that
even core functions of the state are either subcontracted out to private providers, or run (as the
saying has it) “like a business,”82 he adds “the question of what should be public and what
private becomes blurred, as the state itself increasingly organize itself around “profit
centres”(,)”enterprise models” (,) and so on.”83
The question of neoliberalism and property has been a subject of a growing body of
literature during the last few decades, in a conference that was held at Harvard Law School in
2014, a number of political and social activists, political philosophers, anthropologists, and
lawyers discussed “Remaking Property After Neoliberalism,” I will highlight a particular debate
between Dunken Kennedy, the founder of Unbound critical legal students movement at Harvard
81

Narayanswamy, Ramnath. "Restructuring Socialist Ownership." Economic and Political Weekly, 1989, pp. 970971; also see the definition of state capitalism in Nadia R. Farah Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in
Development, Cairo, 2009.
82
Ferguson 172.
83
Ibid.

23

Law School, and Michael Hardt, political philosopher who has co-authored with Antonio Negri
in Empire among other works, to draw on the different takes on the relationship between
property and neoliberalism within critical studies. Kennedy describes left fetishism/ right
fetishism in relation to neoliberalism, “property as slogan deployed in debates about what to do
about policy or about law,” in this context, according to Kennedy ‘property’ is more than a
category but a discourse or a regime of references where certain political ideology and systems
of ‘recognition’ are deployed.84 What Kennedy draws on is the construction of property in
different political contexts, and in this framework, he illustrates that private property is
‘internally incoherent,’ thus, left fetishism takes form when private property is portrayed as a
coherent system imposed by abstract powers on the global south. While he affirms that private
property was and is imposed by dominant economic reforms, such as neoliberal reforms, he
emphasizes the importance of understanding property as a bundle of rights and as a “tool for the
forceful (re-)configuration of social relations,” on both micro and macro levels.85
Collective Resource Management and Resistance
In response, Michael Hardt held a lecture at The European Graduate School on “Property
Law and the Common,” where he draws on the common as the left’s alternative to resource
management and private property,86 he argues that Kennedy presents property from within the
legal construct, and argues that the deconstruction of the pre-existent structures of ownership
would lead back to the commons,87 “the task is to institute free access and circulation of the
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commons.”88 The idea of the collective management of land resources has been revived. with E.
Ostrom Governing the Commons published in 1990 as a pioneer study that exerts empirical data
on different models of governing commons, it’s an anti-thesis to G. Hardin’s popular study on
“The Tragedy of the Commons” published in 1968.89 She examines three models of governing
natural resources, specifically lands, including, Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, game theory,
and M. Olson’s collective action theory.90 In an interview with G. Hardin, he proclaims that,
What I meant when I wrote the Tragedy of the Commons was to call people’s attention to
the fact that the problem of dividing the resources [have] to be done in a way that fits in
with human nature. We shouldn’t expect too much of it. The expectation which you find
in the Marxist ideal from each according to his needs, we know does not work from the
seventy years of experiment in Russia.91
Ostrom, however, delves into the mechanisms of governing the commons and illustrates that the
scale and location of the land plays a key part in the success or failure of collective
management.92
Methodology
This study excerpts methodological tools from discourse and actor-network theories to
examine formal/informal desert development, property/social rights, in relation to state
institution, authorities, and agents. Michel Foucault describes the construction of history, as a
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form of knowledge, as a process where “(…) historians have preferred to turn their attention to
long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal
the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances,”93 Foucault illustrates that in
order to analyse a ‘discursive field’ “we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its
occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations
with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it
excludes.”94
In this context, discourse analysis goes beyond narratives to highlight the relationship
between power and the production of knowledge, providing the needed tools to challenge
hegemonic narratives, “Foucault’s concept of discourse brings us to the question of hegemony
and the power of discourses in establishing a dominant or a counter-hegemonic representation.”95
Foucauldian discourse analysis the reconfiguration of power through social relations, discourse
and the strategy through which both are tied up,96 his analysis of Juridical power and biopower
encompasses the intrinsically link between individuals as subjects and objects of power,97 where
they come to reproduce power structures. Employing Foucauldian concept of power provides a
comprehensive analytical framework for an in-depth analysis of the development discourse, in
relation to other discourses such as the legal and economic, second it shakes our understanding
of binaries as formal vs. informal, development vs. under development and off-development, and
locals vs. outsiders. In his 1975 to 1979 lectures on “The Birth of Biopolitics” at the College de
France where he emphasized on the interrelation between neoliberalism and governmentality “,
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where the subject comes to define themselves within the dominant discourse and internalize
mechanisms of discipline and reproducing power relations and structures, biopolitics.98This line
of thought, have been employed by development anthropologists, such as, James Ferguson,
Akhil Gupta, and Arturo Escobar, who analyze the historical formation of concepts such as
development on both micro and macro levels. In this framework, I apply discourse analysis to
examine the representations of social justice, equality, rights, and state sovereignty in official
representations of desert land reclamation and distribution, I also examine the settlers’
representations of the state and of ownership. The following part examines the methodological
application of Foucauldian discourse analysis in Arturo Escobar’s post-development theory.
While this study does not employ post-development theory, it exerts and employs the same
strategy of discourse analysis.
Discourse Analysis/ Post-Development
Arturo Escobar examines the construction of development as a historical formation that is
a twin to the concept of modernization and one of the main transformative forces towards
economic liberalization and hyper-capitalism.99 Development according to Escobar is a discourse
that can be traced back to the UN’s founding conference and the classification of three worlds,
where certain parts of the world were considered ‘developed’ and others undeveloped according
to their economic progress and level of industrialization.100 Escobar defines development as a
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practice, discourse (regime of representations), and a set of references that individuals come to
identify themselves according to.101
Escobar’s post-development theory, thereby, employs Foucauldian discourse analysis to
examine the historical formation and evolution of development as a regime of references that he
suggests resulted in the ‘modernization of poverty’ and came to imply the intervention to
transform ‘underdeveloped’ countries; thus, the formation of Development's own transnational
legal norms, economic networks and forms of governance.102 He illustrates, unlike other
critiques of the theory of modernization, development can easily be tracked down to the politics
of everyday life through examining mechanisms of transformation, directing the flow of capital,
reshaping desert spaces, in relation to national and international development discourses.103
According to Escobar, during the 1960s, reflections on development crowded the
academic, political and economic fields, Walt Rostow’s model of development, also known as
the model for economic growth, named five stages for development and evaluated the chance of
developing different countries, where pre-capitalist modes of production manifested the main
reason for backwardness in need for development.104 The road to development, presented by
Rostow, was linear and can be attained by passing through fixed stages.105 With the
establishment of the USAID in 1961, the “Act for International Development: A Program for the
Decade of Development” set the basis for U.S. aid policies, strategies for development and the
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underpinning philosophy for adopting this new foreign policy.106 According to the document,
saving undeveloped countries from the evils of communism is a central purpose of the program
that was designed not only to provide aids but technical support as well, the document states:
One of the most critical circumstances of today is that the underprivileged masses in less
developed areas of the free world have a passionate aspiration toward economic, social
and political change. The desire for modernization and industrialization is active and
intense among the nations of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, whether
very old or very new. This irresistible trend toward a better life and toward progress is
well understood in the communist bloc: purposeful communist programs are underway to
exploit the instabilities of the transnational period and to bring the less developed
countries into the communist bloc.107
After the 1980s, a world debt crisis the International Monetary Fund along with the World’s
Bank started to direct reform programs toward indebted countries.108 There are various
interpretations on neoliberalism in academic literature, a very simple definition of neoliberalism
is limited to economy and governance, where neo-liberalism comes to be understood in the
context of a set of market-driven economic reforms or market liberalization and limiting state’s
control.109 Aihwa Ong reviews the various interpretations of neoliberalism in different
disciplines and theoretical interpretations, he states that “neoliberalism is reconfiguring
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relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and
territoriality.”110
Case Study
“Without the ability of legal precedent to draw connections between a case and a general rule,
what would we know about putting matters into a larger context”
— Bruno Latour.111
Tools in actor-network theory are employed to analyze the construction of power
relations in the case of Ard Baza. This study examines social relations that emerge around
contractual agreements and managing resources such as water and electricity. Latour develops a
qualitative observation method for analyzing social and power networks through the analysis of
the nodes and interactions between human actors and non-human technologies such as legal
contracts (legal networks), water pumps, electric transformers, etc. He describes such networks
as flexible interactions where power flows from one social actor to another, “the question of the
social emerges when the ties in which one is entangled begin to unravel; the social is further
detected through the surprising movements from one association to the next; those movements
can either be suspended or resumed,”112 what Bruno illustrates the ‘translational approach’
complicates Foucault’s concept of the subject of power, “in the translation approach the initial
force is never transmitted in its entirety and no matter what happened earlier, it can stop at any
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time depending on the chain; again, instead of a passive medium through which the force is
exerted, there are active members shaping and changing the token as it is moved.”113
In this context, I employ the following research methods:
1- Observation of Participation: As a resident at Ard Baza I’ve dedicated three months to
observe my routinely participation in Ard Baza, in the text I emphasize on occasions and
incidents which highlight the power dynamics, along with, state/individual relations.
2- In-depth interviews with thirteen members of Ard Baza settlement. The interviews were
taped and translated in detail to examine the narratives and representation of the settler’s
land ownership, hand claims, and the registration process.
3- Discourse analysis: Reviewing newspaper articles between 1952 and post-2011 (desert
land distribution, desert development) Microfilm Al-Ahram archive and online; sale
contracts, presidential decrees, Presidential speeches, interviews, and autobiographies, I
also look through legal documents and contracts.
Limitations
In this research, I have conducted fifteen interviews with settlers and plot owners of Ard
Baza, this research was originally designed as an ethnographic study that would have included
more than fifty participants, however, after the demolition incident in 2016 most settlers were
hesitant about participating. And, only ten residents shared with me a full account of their
contractual agreement with the landowner, land price, and their reflections on the ‘People’s
Right’ committee, while the other five provided me with very limited information on their
individual cases. Another limitation or obstacle that faced me while studying the case of Ard
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Baza, is the absence of common spaces. These limitations forced me to shift my focus to more
available sources such as desert development discourse. The limitations and obstacles of
studying Ard Baza emerge from a long history of fieldwork limitations that hinder researchers
from reflecting on different vital issues in the Middle East.

The Organization of the Study
The second Chapter, Contextualizing the History of Egypt’s Desert Development
Reclamation Policies and Discourse(s), examines the emergence of desert reclamation as a
part of Egypt’s national development narrative between 1952 and the present time. It draws on
the influence of the shifting macroeconomic reforms on the reconstruction of desert allocation
and distribution narratives under different political regimes. Academic literature, newspaper
articles, presidential speeches, and project assessment reports are analyzed to study the shift in
policies and narratives. The third chapter, The Case of Ard Baza goes through laws that regulate
Egypt’s desert lands ownership, with a focus on conditional property rights, especially allocation
rights by direct and indirect orders. It also puts into perspective the shifts in conceptualizing
property. The fourth chapter, Dispossession and Narratives of Land Ownership, presents the
findings of a settlement located on Cairo-Alexandria desert road and undergoing the process of
legalization.
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CHAPTER TWO
Contextualizing the History of Egypt’s Desert Development
Reclamation Policies and Discourse(s)
“Histories and discourses arise from, and persist through, relationality and reflexivity-without
reference no effect and no communicability”
S. J. Schmidt, 2016.114
By the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, eighty percent of landowners possessed
twenty percent of lands while 1.5 percent of landowners owned the rest.115 In 1950, H. A.
Dawood notes “the time that it takes an Egyptian agricultural laborer to accumulate the funds
needed to buy even one feddān is almost infinite.”116 Also, K. A. Fargany points out that by the
beginning of the 1950s the agricultural crisis reached its peak as small and landless farmers
living conditions deteriorated and job opportunities in the industrial sector diminished.117 In
September 1952, following the Free Officers’ coup, the Government of Egypt started to work
with the newly enacted Agrarian Reform Bill, which limits land ownership to 200 feddans per
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household, the reform was the main element to the “founding story” of the “1952 “revolution.”118
This chapter will examine the official representations of desert (state) land distribution and
allocation between 1952 and the 1990a, through closely looking into archival materials, state
publications, presidential speeches, archives of official newspapers.

‘The Land is Ours’
“Brethren’s, the land is ours’, to those who work on it. We have abolished feudalism and
feudalists, exploitation and exploiters, but now we must look forward”
—Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣīr, 1954.119
On 23 July 1952, an officer representing the Revolution Command Council announced in
a short broadcast message the abdication of King Farouk. 120 The statement, also known as the
Declaration for the Revolution, stressed on the role of the corrupt monarchy in the Egyptian
military defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, thus obliging the Free Officers to abolish the old
corrupt system and purge the Egyptian military.121 Eradicating feudalism, ending foreign
hegemony, were two key principles of the revolution, along with empowering workers and
impoverished peasants.122 The enactment of the First Agrarian Reform Law in 1952 came to
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represent the Free Officers’ commitment to putting these elements into action.123 The Higher
Committee for Agrarian Reform (HCAR) was founded to manage the requisition and
redistribution of lands that exceed the limits set up by the agrarian law, 200 feddans per
household,124 it was also responsible for distributing newly reclaimed desert lands.125
I. Harik highlights that “liberation of the peasant
stood as a symbol of the liberation of the primordial
Egyptian, not just as part of an economic plan.”126
Broadcasting and documenting land distribution, where
Egypt’s presidents’ visit rural areas and hand over land
contracts to farmers became a tradition that manifests the
president’s commitment to the ideals of the 1952 revolution.
In 1954, few officers, including, Abdel Nasser and Abdel
Hakim Amer, who was then a lieutenant in the Egyptian
military, handed over reform contracts to ‘peasants’ in al-

Figure 2.1. Shows a one page long
congratulary note in Al-Ahram
newspaper, sponsored by Egypt’s
private companies on the sixth
anniversary of the 23rd of July
revolution., 1958. (See Works Cited).

Minya Governorate,127 where Abdel Nasser declared “you are the legitimate owners of the land”
declared Abdel Nasser, “what we are handing over to you today are not land contracts, but
liberation contracts” proclaimed Amer.128
Land Reform: Collective/ Individual Models
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Sayed Marei, President of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform and Minister of
Agriculture, states in his book on Agrarian Reform in U.A.R.: Texts and Documents that after the
enactment of the reform the Ministry of Agriculture sent out 121 letters calling upon the
‘national spirit’ of landowners possessing more than 200 feddans obliging them to hand in their
lands peacefully for redistribution under the administration of the Land Reform Agency, the
executive branch of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform129.130 The reform law entitled
landowners to sell or transfer up to 100 feddans to their children within a ten-year period,131 it
also set the rental rate of land at seven times the tax value.132 In 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who
was then Egypt’s prime minister, asserts that the “(..) Land Reform Bill was, in the main,
designed to liberate the bulk of peasants from the feudalism which was a corollary of the system
of land tenure,”133 he adds, “it is expected that the agrarian reform program will [also] switch a
major part of the nation's capital from agriculture to industry, as big landowners are given
compensation for their estates in the form of bonds which can be invested in industrial
projects.”134
However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, Nasser established a centralized economic
system and implemented aspects of the socialist economy,135 including the nationalization policy
that brought the private sector into the public domain.136 Thus, eradicating the last traces of the
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pre-existing hegemony of landed elites, and directing investments from agriculture and industry
to real estate.137 According to Fragany, nationalizing the Suez Canal company, in 1956, marked
the beginning of a new phase of economic reforms, including nationalizing foreigners’ shares in
Egyptian companies and the expansion of the public sector.138 In this context, desert reclamation
came to represent a new venue for state-led agricultural and industrial development strategy, it
provided the lands needed for the new distributive policies.139
Mudiriyat Al-Tahrir or Tahrir Province, one amongst the first reclamation projects
established after 1952, started up as a military exploration project administered by Magdy
Hassanein, a military engineer, who suggested that the project would be considered for the
establishment of a large-scale reclamation project.140 He assigned a group of military engineers
to study the possibility of reclaiming an area that stretches along the west of the Delta to the
outskirts of Alexandria,141 the project was approved by the Government of Egypt in 1954, 142
and in 1958 a central water station, power station, and electrical substations were established to
facilitate the cultivation of 4000 feddans in Tahrir.143
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Moreover, according to S. Voll, the plan was to reclaim 1.2 million feddans financed by
sold royal property and the early agricultural production of the reclaimed land.144 The official
proposal suggested that Tahrir Province’s lands be distributed among small and landless peasants
after six months of training, however, the lands remained under state’s control.145 R. Springborg,
who wrote extensively on Sayed Marei as a member of a landowning family who managed to be
one of the military revolution’s notability,146 illustrates the
conflicting ideologies of Magdi Hassanein and Sayed Marei on
systems of land tenure that influenced the process of
policymaking.147 For while Marei advocated for a system of
private ownership, Hassanein attempted to keep Tahrir Province

Figure 2.2. A headline from AlAhram on the 2nd of July 1958 that
reads, “New Legal Interpretation of
the Land Reform, Owners of Five
Feddans are Entitled to Deal with
their Property.” (See Works Cited).

outside the administration of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, and under the
administration of the Tahrir Province Organization, that was established in 1957, as a communal
land. Springborg notes:
When it became apparent that Hassanein did not intend to distribute titles of ownership to
peasants, Marei attempted to force his hand by calling him to testify before the committee
for Ownership and Exploitation of Reformed Land, which was itself under Marei’s
Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform.148
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The conflict between Marei and Hassanein resulted in the outset of Hassanein in 1957 and Tahrir
Province came to be managed under the Agrarian Reform Law.149 During In the same year
Hassanein took his seat in the National Assembly, N. Ibrahim states that one of his most popular
slogans for the election was “vote for Magdy Hassanein who established Tahrir Province.”150
Ibrahim notes that one day before the first parliamentary session was held ten members
submitted a form to the head of the parliament requesting dropping Hassanein membership due
to rumors of irregularities in the accounts of the Province, their
request denied and instead Hassanein was forced out of Tahrir
Figure 2.3. The picture shows a
headline from Al-Ahram daily
newspaper on the 11th of July 1958,
that announces “Granting full
ownership of 1000 Feddans in
Tahrir Province to 400 Families.
The Establishment of a Rest House
on Cairo Alexandria Highway to
Sell the Tahrir’s Products.” (See
Works Cited).

Province.151
On the 13th of July 1958, Marei declared in an article in
Al-Ahram newspaper that the reform policy is premised on a
respect for private ownership and that there are no communal
farms in Egypt.152 Along similar lines, the National Charter of

1962 states that “in the agricultural sector, Arab socialism does not believe in the nationalization
of land but in individual ownership within limits that prevent feudalism. It believes also in
agricultural cooperation in terms of credit, use of modern machinery, and marketing.”153
However, in 1961, the Tahrir Province Organization was established and once again Tahrir
Province was under the administration of Abdel Mohsen Abu el-Noor, one of the Free
Officers.154 Also, land holdings were confiscated under a new Agrarian Reform Law that
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reduced the ceiling of land ownership to 100 feddans.155 Few
scholars note that the early reform strategy entitled peasants
to usufruct Intifa‘ contracts,156 the underlying evidence
suggests that the terms of usufruct rights were contextualized

Figure 2.4. Sub headline from The New
York Times, 13 March 1962. Headline
“Cairo Congress to Weigh New Nasser
Charter.” (See Works Cited).

in the Egyptian civil law to entitle peasants to sell their usufruct rights and apply for loans.157
Nasser’s economic doctrine was crystallized in the First
Five Years Plan (1960/61- 1965/66) which set the national
development goals, including plans for agricultural and
industrial development,158also the 1962 Charter listed horizontal

Figure 2.5. “Reclaiming 25,000 Feddan
of Waste lands in South Tahrir.” Source:
Al-Ahram, 22 May 1961. (See Works
Cited).

expansion into the desert, along with vertical expansion and the mechanization of agriculture as
the basis for the “battle of production,” and rural development.159 In this context desert
reclamation and the development of new communities emerged as a key pillar for national
development and the redistribution of national income, directing public investments towards
large irrigation projects and the mechanization of agriculture.160
By the end of the First Five Years Plan, the Government of Egypt reported a 3.3 percent
growth in agriculture,161 a 12.5 percent increase of agricultural labor wages from agricultural
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production to 32 percent, and a significant increase in the rates of savings and investments.162 In
1966, Nasser announced in a speech that he delivered on Labor Day in El-Mahala El-Kobra, the
outcomes of the first plan and a Second Five Years Plan (1965/66- 1970/71) underway where
more than 598 million Egyptian pounds is to be allocated to agriculture, including forty-one
million to complete the construction of the High Dam.163D. E. Wahdan states “in spite of its
socialist-welfare underpinnings under the slogan of "subsistence and fairness" "kefaya wa 'adl'",
national planning - as well as its physical avatar- failed to correct, let alone ameliorate, uneven
spatial development.”164 International investments in new desert spaces throughout the 1950s and
60s and manifested in a few projects by the USSR including a project of reclaiming 10,000
feddans in North Tahrir (1964-1970), and the community-building and reclamation activities
carried out by the Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service Project, EARIS, including
their projects in South Tahrir since 1952,165both deployed different systems of land distribution.
The spatial division of communal farms in North Tahrir and individually owned tracts in
the south mimicked the cold war spatial representations that were taking place in various
countries in that time. In the context of desert development and land ownership rights, it
represented two systems of distribution on which socialist and capitalist economies are premised.
The USAID evaluation report that was published in 1983 under the title “Egypt: The Egyptian
American Rural Improvement Service, A Point Four Project, 1952-63,” states that:
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The clash of ideologies and modalities became most apparent in the US conception of
EARIS, in sharp contrast with the Egyptian-planned Tahrir Province. In developmental
terminology, Tahrir vs EARIS represented two distinct and divergent approaches-'modernization from the top ' vs 'modernization from below. In the American perception,
the Tahrir province represented a clear example of 'modernization from the top', where
the Egyptian government followed statist principles by providing financing,
organizational directions, and technical cadres, and permitted only limited peasant
participation.166
Nasser’s era advocacy for socialist-inspired development policies and his growing dependency
on Soviet loans, especially in the industrial sector which subsequently increased the Soviet
Union’s influence in the development and the modernization of agriculture, influenced the
general development strategy.167 On the other hand, while Nasser has blocked various aspects of
American-Egyptian assistance, agriculture was the only field open for cooperation under the
EARIS and the wheat to Egyptian pound program under Public Law 480.168
The administrative set-up of agricultural development and land reclamation under Nasser
has been subjected to several changes throughout the 1950s and 60s were in some cases different
bodies were established to perform the same function.169 Most importantly in 1961 the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation was established to carry out agricultural development
and reclamation projects and in 1967 Marei was assigned to the Ministry.170 Also, in 1967 the
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Egyptian Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Lands, EAUDRL, came to
replace the EARIS, the Tahrir Province Organization, and the Egyptian Organization for
Rehabilitation.171
In his speech to the nation in 1970, Nasser highlighted what Egypt has accomplished in
the mission of “conquering the desert,” proclaiming that 850,000 feddans have been reclaimed,
the rate of growth in agricultural production increased by 15 percent and 40 percent agricultural
exports.172
Re-Defining the Rule of Law and Social Justice
On December 29, 1970, The New York Times reports
“(…) Mr. Sadat's first moves upon taking office as President
was reported to order a review of the practice of seizures
known as sequestration,”

173

this was followed by several

Figure 2.6. New York Times 2 Jan 1972. (See
Works Cited).

decisions that reversed Nasser’s economic reforms, agrarian reform. By 1975 the government
has returned most of the confiscated lands to their original owners or offered compensation equal
to their lands’ value.174 As for desert reclamation, Sadat’s policy was twofold, while some large
state-planned reclamation projects were established with the aim of utilizing water from the High
Dam, full ownership over desert land tracts were now provided by the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Ministry of Housing to private investors and individual farmers.175 Throughout the 1970s
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there has been a gradual shift from centralized compulsory policies of cropping patterns, the
pricing, and marketing of agricultural products.176
In an interview with the Egyptian T.V. on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 23rd of July
Sadat declares “capitalism has failed, and so did socialism which used the peasants and workers
either to sow dissension between them and the intellectuals, or to exploit them in the interest of
the one-man rule,” he adds “democratic socialism has clear-cut landmarks.”177 On May 1971
Sadat declared the imprisonment and the exclusion of ministers and key public figures in
Nasser’s era as a response to their mass resignation from the government, Sadat referred to this
as the Rectification Revolution, also known as the Corrective Revolution.178 In a speech
addressed to the nation he portrayed the main points of departure between his regime and that of
Nasser, the key point of difference is how both define the role of the state in managing social,
economic and political life. He accused Nasser’s Political Office and the “centers of power” of
spreading fear and hatred, Ǧabal el ḥekd, among different social classes and factions, and set a
mission of eradicating “centers of power,” and promote social and political justice.179Sadat,
however, was keen to represent himself as a part of an “ongoing revolution” and as a legitimate
heir of Nasser’s legacy.180 Under Sadat’s administration, Sayed Marei has occupied high state
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positions, he was the Deputy Prime Minister for Agriculture and Irrigation, Head of the Egyptian
Parliament (1974-1977), the President’s Assistant in 1978, and Head of the President’s Advisory
Council in 1980.181
Open Door Policy
Prior to the Revolution-aspirations for social justice, true democracy, liberation of the
land usurped by a foreign power through the force of arms, and protected by international
feudalism, liberation of the landowner from an Egyptian usurper who robbed its rightful
owner who tilled it, and deprived him of the basic rights of life, indeed every right
through domination by local feudalism which controlled government, man, and destiny.
—Anwar el- Sādāt, 1977182
The 1973 war, was followed by a wave of economic liberation reforms that came to be
known as Open Door reforms taking place after the enactment of Law No. 43 of 1974 which
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allowed for foreign and Arab investments.183 S. Hibbard and A.
Layton illustrate that “the infitah helped to create the conditions for
a real estate and credit boom, ultimately adding to Egypt's foreign
debt as the country became increasingly dependent upon foreign
financing and investment.”184Along similar lines, A. Richards
notes “in 1974 Egypt became a net importer of agricultural
commodities for the first time in its history.”185 Thus, by 1975
Egypt’s short-term debts reached 1168 million dollars, eight times
more than Egypt’s debt in 1970.186
To reduce Egypt’s debt, the International Monetary Fund
Figure 2.7. Two caricature
drawings by Salah Jahin, an
Egyptian poet and cartoonist.
The drawings show a shift in
the representation of ‘the
people’. The first shows a
peasant as a symbol for the
Egyptian the people, the second
shows a public officer. Source:
Al-Ahram dated 1969 and 1972.
(See Works Cited).

urged Egypt to undertake some austerity measures, and on
December 1977 Abdullah Al Kaysouny, Deputy Prime Minister for
Finance and Economic Affairs, announced cutting public subsidies
on food products.187As a result, protests in opposition to raising
food prices erupted across Egypt and the state was forced to cancel

the subsidy cuts.188 In an interview with CBS later the same year, El Sadat accused the protesters
of being communist agents who aim at overthrowing the regime and spread “communist
propaganda.”189
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Following the Camp David Accords in 1978 the United States offered Egypt a yearly aid
of 2.1 billion dollars,190 as a result by the end of the 1970s, land reclamation projects and
agricultural development became sites for Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, as a part of normalizing
the relationship with Israel instigated by the Camp David Accords.191 H. Redda notes that while
Camp David Agreement did not point to agricultural cooperation between the two countries,
since the Camp David Accords, Israel has successfully penetrated Egypt’s agricultural market
and provided technical support in reclamation projects, especially Nubariya.192 In 2012, Y.
Azulai reported that “exports of goods from Israel to
Egypt grew by 60% last year, to $236 million. The
Export Institute attributes the steep rise to a dramatic rise Figure 2.8. The New York Times, October
18, 1979. (See Works Cited).

in Egyptian demand for Israeli chemicals, mainly
agricultural fertilizers.” 193
Under the umbrella of the Infitāḥ, in 1976 agricultural cooperatives’ activities has been
limited and later the same year Law 117 dictated that cooperatives’ responsibilities be transferred
to The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit.194 Moreover, the EAUDRL was
abolished and transformed into companies, however, while some scholars analyze this
transformation as attempts to “free the state farms from the bureaucratic restrictions,”195 a year
earlier the General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development,
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GARPAD, according to Presidential Decree No. 269 of 1975,196 was established to draw up the
general policy for desert land reclamation, utilization, and cultivation also to cooperate with
other institutions and organizations responsible for establishing infrastructure for desert
projects.197 D. Sims names four governmental bodies that currently control desert reclamation;
the GARPAD, Ministry of Defense and Military Production, Ministry of Interior, and holding
companies that operate under the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Investment.198 The
New Urban Communities Authority, that works under the Ministry of Housing, also plays an
important role in desert reclamation and cultivation.199
In 1973 the General Organization for Physical
Planning (GOPP) was established in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 1093, carry out a number of
responsibilities including urban development plans and

Figure 2.9. Presidential Decree No. 123 of 1978
for the allocation of the needed lands to
establish Sadat City. (See Works Cited).

follow-up assessments.200 W. J. Dorman notes that “in April 1974, Sadat inaugurated what was
to become Egypt’s main urban development policy: the construction of new desert cities,”201
During the 1970s five satellite cities were established including; the Tenth of Ramadan (1977),
6th of October (1979), and Sadat City (1978), 15th of May (1978), and Borg El-Arab (1979), all
were designed to include agricultural, industrial, and residential areas.202 According to Mona
Abaza, “clearly, the neoliberal newly rich have opted to get out of Cairo . . . The late President
Sadat was behind the idea of creating new satellite cities, such as the Tenth of Ramadan, Sixth of
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October and Sadat Cities. Expansion in the direction of desert cities continued under President
Mubarak when al-Shuruk, Quattameyya Heights and Rehab were created,”203 such new
constructions and forms of urbanization were imitated in informal settlements, quasi- gated
communities, workers’ residential areas surrounded and expanded from these developments. In
1979 the New Urban Communities Authority was established, to carry out different operations,
including planning new urban centers and preventing urban encroachment on agricultural
lands.204 Also, subsidized low-priced residential units.205
Sadat has managed to create his own reform analog and a governance system that has
survived long after he was assassinated in October 1981. The reconstruction of Nasser’s legacy
and emptying out notions such as social justice of the meanings attributed to them in Nasser’s era
took place in a variety of forms, however, Sadat still promoted himself as the legitimate heir of
Nasser, most importantly of the July ‘revolution’. In this context, I argue that beneath what
appeared to be a linear progression toward liberalizing the economy, the institutional and
legislative set up in Sadat’s era laid their heavy presence on patterns of desert development and
land ownership until today. In this context, not only did state’s control over desert lands’
ownership prevailed under Sadat, but was entrenched into the desert land management Law No.
143 of 1981.206 The law also granted the ministry under which desert lands are allocated, the
right to dispose of land without an auction.207
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‘Land to the Tiller’: A Growing ‘Informal Sector’
In Egypt (,) the people have been used to electric shocks, but that time has passed. I could
give the people very good speeches, but I am not that type of man. I like to work quietly.
The people want to eat, they want housing and water. I could easily provide anesthesia
for the people, but I’m a man for long-term policies, not for electric shocks.
— Muḥammad Ḥosnī Mubārak, 1983.208
For three decades, during Mubarak’s presidency, his speeches mimicked the now eroded
revolutionary narrative of his predecessors, at least for the first decade of his presidency there
were no significant changes in land reclamation and agricultural policies.209 During the 1980s
and 90s, the Egyptian government established a number of new urban communities to “(…)
channel informal urbanization towards the state-owned desert periphery;”210 including; New
Salhyia (1982), Obour (1982), Badr City (1982), New Beni Suef (1986), New Nubariya (1986),
New Minya (1986), Sheikh Zayed (1995), New Aswan (1999), and Shorouk City. 211 Except for
Nubariya, no lands were allocated to agricultural investments or crop production.212
The legal ambiguity of the land registration system, the contracts granted to farmers and
graduates by the government, in addition the growing trend of grabbing desert lands, wad ‘yadd,
or “squatter reclamation” as translated by Sims,213 all accumulated creating a complex informal
sector that encompassed different actors including Bedouins, small farmers, local land investors,
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agribusinesses, and real estate development companies. Thus, throughout the 1980s and 90s, as
informal urbanization boomed, a shadow land market replica took place in the Egyptian
desert.214
To control the growing informal occupation of desert lands, Law No. 30 of 1984 was
issued giving hand claimers a six months’ time limit to register the lands which they claim, and
in 1986 the Parliament issued Law No. 3 regarding the liquidation of some of the conditions
arising from the laws of agrarian reform to encourage occupants to register their lands, the first
article of the amendment states,
Lands that has been seized for more than fifteen years in accordance with the provisions
of Decree Law No. 178 of 1952 [the first Agrarian Reform Law], Law No. 127 of 1961
and Law No. 15 of 1963 on the Prohibition of foreigners’ ownership of Agricultural
Lands and the like, and Law No. 50 of 1969 which establishes a maximum limit for
family and individual ownership. And have not been objected or appealed should be
declared as seized.215
The GARPAD, as well as other ministries to which desert lands are allocated, were assigned to
study the cases of land grabs and the duration of their occupation. The law entitled occupants to
contracts in case they have claimed the land and used it for more than fifteen years, given that
they do not change the pattern of land use.216 Under the Structural Adjustment Policies that the
Egyptian government undertaken during the 1990s the agricultural market was completely
liberated from states control. S. Al-Nour asserts that the government cut subsidies on agricultural
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inputs, fertilizers, and pesticides, and privatized land resources.217 In 1992 the Parliament
approved a tenancy law proposal submitted by the National Democratic Party to “regulate the
relationship between landowners and tenants,” the law was fully implemented in 1997.218 In
accordance with the law within five years, the agricultural land rent from seven times tax value
to twenty-two times the land tax and by 1997 landowners was free to determine the rent value
according to market prices.219 The law has led to a series of protests known as Peasants’
Uprising, or Intifādāt el felāḥeen, from 1997 to 2000.220
According to Al-Nour, law 96 has led to the
eviction of an estimated number of 904 thousand
tenants.221 In this context, for at least the first six years
after the implementation of the law, Mubarak’s
reclamation project, established in 1986 for new

Figure 2.11. Title from Al-Ahrar leftist
newspaper, on 23 January 1997. In an
interview with, Mustafa Kamel Murad,
president of Al-Ahrar leftist party, he states
“Law 96 is Consistent with Sharia, and the
Protection of Private Property is a Must.”
(See Works Cited).

graduates, accepted applications from farmers who have
lost their lands. 222 Settlers were chosen by the administrative officials of the project according to
their; age, sex, origin, date of graduation, and their background in farming. In this context those
who were young, males with rural origins, recent School of Agriculture graduates represented
the perfect candidates for the project.223 The project was financed by international organizations
and investors including; the USAID, and the International Center for Agricultural Research in
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the Dry Areas, ICARDA, and Israeli assistance.224 In an
interview on 22 February 1989 with the Israeli Television
Moshe Arens, Israeli Foreign Minister, proclaims “with

Figure 2.12. From Al-Akhbar, 4 June
1997. “Land to the Tiller Given that the
Conditions of Agriculture are Stable.”
(See Works Cited).

Israeli technological assistance, with the assistance of Israeli
specialists, one can see ‘beautiful Eretz Yisrael’ in Egypt, along Cairo-Alexandria
highway.”225In 2002, however, under a new investment law approved by the Parliament,
graduates were “entitled to sell their lands.”226
Conclusion: Post-2011/ Informal Encroachments
During the 1950s and 60s, collective ownership was promoted by Nasser’s political elite
as a tool for empowering peasants, the adoption of the set of economic liberation policies during
the 1970s, known as the Open-Door policies, entailed a different form of landed resource
management, especially in the case of New Lands’ development. El ʿard lemān yazrʿhā or “land
to the tiller,” was the government’s slogan throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, to encourage
farmers and graduates to reclaim desert lands. The unintelligibility of land registration system,
among other factors, have led to a boom in wad ‘yadd or hand claims.
Following the 2011 revolution, the involvement of businessmen and Mubarak’s family in
land deals was an issue which occupied much of the post-revolution debates on the corruption of
the old system, Mitchel highlights that:
The fall of the Mubarak regime allowed a fuller exposure of the regime’s mode of
operation: The vast areas of public land allocated to private interests at low prices, the
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unauthorized taking of tens of thousands of acres of desert land, the waste of
extraordinary quantities of public funds in building infrastructure for ill-conceived megaprojects that had failed to produce effective results, and the revenues lost in the
disorganized and unregulated privatization of public assets.227
As a result, in 2016 President Sisi ordered the establishment of the ‘People’s Right’ campaign in
the name of retrieving looted state lands, the establishment of the committee was celebrated in
the mainstream official media as a step towards fighting a
long heritage of corruption, however, the execution of
demolition orders against low-income squatter settlements
and the recent presidential orders to once again transfer the
cases of legalizing informal desert settlement to the local
city councils mahalyiat which have a long legacy of
corruption, puts the efficiency of the newly enacted policy
of retrieving state lands into question.

Figure 2.12. ‘Wad ‘yadd Violations Setttles on
Egyptian Lands as ‘Schistosoma.’” Source:
Nahdet Misr Newspaper, 21 May 2011. (See
Works Cited).

This was extracted from Timothy Mitchells’s foreword to David Sims’s book Egypt’s Desert Dreams:
Development or Disaster? That was published by The American University in Cairo Press in 2014.
227

54

CHAPTER THREE
The Case of Ard Baza
“. . . The new lands in the western desert along the Alexandria-Cairo desert highway have
become the demonstration site for the ‘greening of the desert’ with Nubariya as the epicenter”
—Hanne Adriansen228
The desert road leads out of Cairo from behind the pyramids, cutting through the desert
west of the Delta up towards the city of Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast. The
villas and Mango orchards give way to rocky hills as the road wind steadily up towards
the desert escarpment over the crest of the hill, past the Pyramid Heights resort, the road
starts to descend down to a sandy plain. Billboards alongside nascent housing
developments highlight the promise of the future; a space of luxury and clean air.
—Jessica Barnes, 2004.229
The rapid development of Cairo-Alexandria desert road,230 coupled with the flourishment
of the North Coast as a destination for domestic leisure visitors, have led to an influx of road
travelers. On the west of Cairo-Alexandria desert highway, km 91from Cairo, Ard Baza is barely
a blur to road travelers; even when approaching the broken gate of Ard Baza, one does not
assume that there is any form of life inside. The small population of Ard Baza is constituted of
only ten families who permanently reside on the land and more than one hundred plot-holder
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who resides elsewhere, agricultural labor, and guards; the rest of the land has either been
abandoned due to lack of resources (namely, electricity and water) or is managed by labor or
family members to an absentee owner. The 215 feddans of Ard Baza are held under primary,
‘urfi, contracts between the current plot-holders and the alleged landowner, Baza, who have
occupied the land in 1989 under a three-year lease contract that should have led to ownership.
Plot-holders use three main landmarks to locate Ard Baza, namely Sadat City; Prison No. 430
and 440231on the other side of the road; and The Monastery of Saint Macarius, one kilometer
away from the gate of Ard Baza. Since the settlement was not a part of any formal development
plans, no official records exist on Ard Baza except for land contracts and individual initiatives to
map the land from the Egyptian Survey Authority, ESA.
Contextualizing the History of Ard Baza

Ard Baza

Figure 3 Part of Sadat City and Ard Baza on both sides of Cairo-Alexandria desert road. (Imagery dated 2016, ©2016 GOOGLE.)
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A Chain of Titles: Land Transaction(s) and Development
In 1978, the President of Egypt issued Decree No. 123 to allocate119 thousand feddān of
state lands on Cairo-Alexandria desert road under the administration of Beheira governorate,232
extending from kilometre eighty-four from Cairo to kilometre 110, to the Ministry of Housing to
establish a City that was named after the President of Egypt Anwar el-Sadat, Sadat City.
Commenced as an agro-industrial city, the Ministry of Housing allocated the desert lands
surrounding Sadat to individuals and companies who were assigned to use the land for
agricultural purposes, adding up to what was then a growing green belt surrounding Egypt’s
cities; “when the new towns of 6th [of] October 10th [of] Ramadan, and Sadat were designed in
the late 1970s, there was a vision to surround these emerging cities with a green belt [to preserve
environmental balance]”233.
In July 1989, Sadat City Authority allocated 106 feddans to Baza, a retired officer at
Sadat City Authority, who bought the land at a public auction under the condition that he uses it
only for agriculture or food security projects; however, Baza started selling small plots of land to
individuals and rent other plots to companies from as early as the year 1990, using the record,
māhdār, as a proof of ownership. Baza, who is originally from Monufia Governorate, and moved
to Sadat City in the 1970s to work as a public servant in the City Authority. Baza bought the land
after his retirement under his title, his wife’s, two sons, and daughter, in a phone interview with
his son, a 35 years old lawyer who manages the family business including the land and electrical
supplies shops in Sadat, he states:
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We bought the land in the 80s when we first came, the land was not leveled, and had no
water or electrical supply, we worked hard to provide the needed facilities to sell the
land. First, we dug a well, and we bought an electrical transmitter that cost us about
90,000 Egyptian pounds. . . I was still young when my father bought the land, but I
remember it was a wasteland full of snakes, we have worked a lot to make the land
suitable for living. . . we first sold lands per feddans, but a lot of people were not capable
to buy a whole feddān, so we started selling smaller tracts of lands.
In 2002, the land originally allocated to Sadat City east of the Cairo-Alexandria desert road,
including Ard Baza, was demarked as a part of the Wadi el-Natrun, Beheira governorate.
According to which, land management was transferred
from Sadat City Authority to the GARPAD, established
in 1975, which operates under The Ministry of
Agriculture and Land Reclamation. Among the many
predicaments that resulted from the new administrative
division, was the invalidation of the contract between
Baza and Sadat City Authority. As a result, Baza was
obliged to sign a new contract with the GARPAD for
only ninety-four feddans as a hand claimer wad‘yadd.

Figure 3. 2. Above: A part of Ard Baza
(Imagery dated 2004, ©2016 GOOGLE.)
Below: Ard Baza (Imagery dated 2016,
©2016 GOOGLE.)

The primary, ‘urfi or ibtida’y, contract234 included the following terms and conditions:(1)
the signer agrees to the terms and conditions of the contract; (2) the first party (the state) sold an
area of ninety-four feddans to the second party (Baza); (3) the price of the land is 200 Egyptian
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Pounds per-feddān; (4) the second party vows to use the land for agricultural purposes; (5) the
second party is obliged to use drip irrigation and sprinklers; (6) the second party agrees to
provide water for irrigation; (7) the second party is committed to hand over the property and the
contract will be cancelled if the land is required by any governmental authority within five years
from signing the contract, however, the second party can negotiate with the governmental
authorities to get a compensation for their property; (8) the second party is obliged to preserve
state mines, quarries, mineral, and oil wealth;(9) the second party is obliged to plan roads,
irrigation and sanitation networks within the boundaries of the land ;(10) the second party is
committed to handing over the land, including the property and the facilities to the first party
[GARPAD] in case the contract is cancelled; (11) the second party is obliged not to exceed the
limits of land ownership stipulated by law No. 143 of 1981;(12) it is prohibited to sell or rent the
land before seven years from the date of paying full land price; (13) the first party is to notify the
Real Estate Taxes Commission upon signing the contract; (14) the provisions of Law No. 143 of
1982 (Desert Land Ownership Law) and the executive regulations under decree 198 of year 1982
(State’s Private Property Law), apply to this contract.
As noted before, according to Law 143 of 1981, desert land transactions between the state
and individuals, as well as among individuals, is regulated by the Egyptian Civil Law, unlike the
case of other forms of public property (for example military lands), desert lands’ contractual
rights does not fall under the concept of contracts of submission, Iḏ ‘an.235 In the abovementioned case, the primary agreement between the state institution (GARPAD) and Baza is
only a temporary agreement that should have eventually led to ownership, however, according to
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a research that The Egyptian Centre for Policy Studies conducted in 2015, the transaction of
desert state lands to individuals is rarely completed which leaves settlers in a precarious situation
since the termination of the contract can be directly executed by the administrative body to
which the land is allocated (GARPAD) in this case, without further juridical review.236
The Termination of Baza’s Contract
Throughout the 90s Baza sold plots of lands that do not exceed one feddān each to
individuals, after the land was transferred to GARPAD and resold to Baza in 2003, Baza started
further fragmenting the land and selling tracts to individuals per-meter, who mostly used the land
for residential purposes, Baza have also informally occupied 121 feddans between 2003 and
2014; consequently, on 8 September 2014 the Property and Disposition Department of GARPAD
sent a letter to the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun police station urging him to carry out the
Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation’s order concerning the demolition of illegal
buildings on Ard Baza upon the termination of the contract between him and the GARPAD due
to changing the land use that was agreed upon from agricultural to residential purposes. The
demolition order was first of three orders that were reprieved for ‘impossibility of
implementation since some families permanently reside on Ard Baza.
There are conflicting interpretations over the reasons behind the termination of the
contract between Baza and the GARPAD, one settler explained to me that the termination of the
contract came after a dispute between the St. Macarius Monastery and Baza over a piece of land,
Mourad, a resident of Ard Baza explains:
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Baza should have owned the land, but a dispute between him and the Monastery drew a
lot of attention to him as a corrupt man, and officials inside the GARPAD wanted to
punish him by terminating his contract. The whole thing started after the revolution, in
2011, when the monastery built a wall between them and Ard Baza, and according to
Baza the wall was built on his land and to him, this is a lot of lands, especially since he
was selling it per meter.
Along similar lines, Baza’s son affirms that:
We have paid the full land price to Sadat’s City Authority, but in 2002, the new
administrative division allocated our land to The Ministry of Agriculture, which assigned
a committee to re-evaluate my land and divided it into two pieces, a fully-owned sixtyfour feddans, and a 113 feddans under a usufruct contract, that would have eventually led
to ownership. . . the first demolition order was issued on the 28th of February 2011, a time
when all state institutions were suspended . . . we believe it has something to do with the
Monastery.
While this narrative can easily be refuted especially after the issuance of several confiscation and
demolition orders against constructions and settlements outside of the official boundaries of
cities and governorates, it casts a light on the dimensions of contestation over lands between
individuals and the state, and among individuals. The authors of “Landownership Disputes in
Egypt— A Case Study on the Tensions Around the Monastery of Aby Fana in May 2008,”
highlight that “most of the land being reclaimed is involved in serious conflicts,” they add “these
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are taking place between all sort(s) of parties ranging from major families, small families or big
landowners to big companies, whether they have official rights or not.”237
On 8 September 2014, the GARPAD sent the Commissioner of Wadi El-Natrun Police
Station a letter pointing out to the issuance of a several demolition orders by the Minister of
Agriculture against Ard Baza, the order was not executed, however, in 2016 the ‘People’s Right’
campaign executed the order on two buildings in Ard Baza (chapter four).
The following are the comments of two settlers on the history of Ard Baza and the
process of land registration:
(1)Landowner Baza received a parcel of land, 106 feddān on the green belt west of CairoAlexandria desert road, that was the under the administration of the New Urban
Communities (Sadat City Authority); (2) We signed a sales
contract with Baza 1999, in accordance with his contract with
Sadat City Authority; (3) A Ministerial Decree was issued
regarding the administrative borders of Sadat, and Ard Baza was
transferred to the GARPAD under the Ministry of Agriculture;
(4) Baza signed a new primary contract with the GARPAD on
only a total area of 94.6 feddans in 2003; (4)We filed a lawsuit
against Baza, the GARPAD, and The Ministry of Defense to
prove our ownership of the land; (5) Baza disagree in the area
that we’ve claimed;(6) when we went to the GARPAD to

Fig.3.3. An original hand-written
copy of the settlers’ comments.

recheck Baza’s contract, they ensure that Baza has paid the full
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land price, but refuse to give us any documents; (7) we obtain the chain of ownership
from Damanhour Real Estate Registration Office; (8) the GARPAD refuses our request to
prove ownership, and notify us in court that Baza’s contract has been terminated.
The distance between the gate of Ard Baza and the road that leads to the Monastery of St.
Macarius is a walking distance; according to the Monastery’s website, St. Macarius Monastery
was first built in 360 A.D., in 1969 the monastery was restored, and in 1978 “President Sadat
donated a thousand feddans of desert lands, two tractors and a new well”238 to the desert fathers
who have been reclaiming desert lands within the boundaries of the monastery since 1975:

(. . .) the monastery is participating in solving the country's food supply problems.
Particularly noteworthy is a new type of fodder crop (fodder beet), which the monks have
cultivated for the first time in Egypt. This experiment holds (the) promise of relieving
problems of (stock farming) once it is established throughout the country. In gratitude for
this (pioneering) work, President Sadat donated to the monastery in 1978 a thousand
feddans of desert land.239

Settlers and plot-owners at Ard Baza, have developed relationships with the desert fathers;
specifically, through the outlets of the monastery, where many settlers go to buy monastery’s
products, settlers have been introduced to the Monastery. “I have developed good relations with
the fathers at St. Macarius, and I go to them for advice, they helped me plant olive trees and now
I sell olive oil,” stated Yehia, a permanent resident at Ard Baza; Olivia, another participant
explains, these are people who really succeeded in agriculture, their prices are reasonable and the
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quality of their products is high-quality.” To resolve the dispute with Baza, the monastery sent an
official from the GARPAD and Father Gabriel, a resident of Ard Baza, to negotiate with Baza
over the price of the land on which the monastery has built the wall, however, the issue was not
resolved.
Bedouins, Security, Exclusivity, and the Absence of Common Spaces
There are several ways through which settlers exclude others from accessing their
property; fences, walls, doors, and locks are few of these ways; segregation and fortification
have been issues of a growing urban debate, in this context, the booming gated communities and
thrive in securitizing space has been portrayed by several scholars as a manifestation of the
modern urban life. The first thing that struck one upon arrival to Ard Baza, is the absence of
common spaces, an area of 215 feddans is divided into several plots that are either fenced or
guarded, one settler explains “with the very precarious situation we’re in, anyone can claim
ownership by simply occupying the land.” Such fear accentuated after Baza employed a group of
Bedouins to guard the land around 2004.
Larissa Katz describes two approaches to understanding property, property as a bundleof rights and property as the exclusion of others ‘to distinguish owners from non-owners,’ the
‘boundary approach’ “an exclusivity-based approach better explains the nature of ownership and
also the institutional structure which it depends,”240 empirical evidence from Ard Baza, brings
the binary between the customary and the legal construction of property into fold; it is a case of
voluntarily imitating and implementing exclusivity in formal property to extra-legal property,
this is not the case in property that has been occupied by Bedouins. There are various
240
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Interpretations on the history of the Bedouins in Ard Baza, some claim that the Bedouins have
moved from Wadi El-Natrun to Ard Baza shortly after Baza bought the land, others claim that
they have only been present for the last couple of years, however, in the examined individual
cases, settlers report paying the Bedouin family a monthly security fee, those who do not pay
have at least encountered upon the leader of the Bedouin family.
Resource Management and Networks: Macro/ Micro Management
Water
On the 23rd of July 1970, Nasser gave a speech in the fourth round of the Arab National
Socialist Cooperation, beginning his speech with a message from the Minister of the High Dam,
In the Name of the High Dam builders who vowed to complete the establishment of the
first High Dam power station on the eighteenth anniversary of the revolution and in
recognition of their sacrificed against imperial conspiracy to frustrate their determination,
I am pleased to announce the completion of establishing the first power station.241
The construction of the High Dam marked the beginning of mega desert reclamation
projects, in desert areas water supply is either taken from the nearest surface water or from
underground wells, the problem that most of the settlers face is the high salinity of underground
water, which ranges between 1500- 3000 Particle Per Meter or PPM, the quality have degraded
throughout the last ten years due to the “establishment of agribusinesses and industries in Wadi
El Natrun,” Murad, a settler who works in the field of underground water management,
explained to me, he adds, “factories and lands that are used under usufruct rights do not care if
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the quality of water degrades over the years, they take a piece of land for ten or so years and
when the water salinity increases, they end the contracts.”242
Jessica Barnes examines the role of pumps in the formation of new communities and the
death of old ones, “The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation controls the flow of water
through the network of main and branch canals,”243 she adds, the water moves out of the
ministry’s control at the point at which it is taken from the branch canal.”244
A network of social interactions forms mainly around water, and electricity, at Ard Baza.
Since there is no water supply for Ard Baza, settlers dig wells either collectively or individually,
mostly without digging permits, another option is to connect a pipe to Baza’s pipe network and
pay-per-hour for water supply. The few underground water wells provide for the whole
settlement, and Baza’s well is the one with the lowest salinity level, thus most of the settlers have
agreements with Baza to provide them with water. Baza employed a former desert father who is
also a settler at Ard Baza to manage collecting bills, distributing water, and looking into disputes
related to water with settlers.
Olivia, a plot-owner explains:
I pay 1500 a year to Baza just to water very few trees that I have planted. . . I tried to dig
my own well and I paid a huge amount of money to find out that the water in my area is
not suitable for agriculture, so I decided to stop all cultivating and livestock activities and
I regret to say that my land is now abandoned.

For more about Egypt’s strategy for using water, see, Barbra, Ibrahim and Fouad Ibrahim. Egypt: An Economic
Geography. I. B. Tauris, 2003.
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Another settler explains that he used to take water from Baza and installed a water meter, he
explains that:
first, we had a meter and we paid regularly for water but someone destroyed it. . . I think
that Baza has something to do with it because soon after the meter was destroyed he
started to ask for more money and claim he opens the water for more hours than he
actually does. I have not paid for a year now, and the water supply is not regular now.
And we have to go to Sadat City to fill a small water tank every week.
Electricity
The settlement has a very limited number of electric power transformers, as well, each
distributes power among two to five consumers or houses. In most cases, the agreement among
which the electricity is distributed is not based on a legal right. People agree amongst themselves
in terms of paying the bills collectively without having separate electric meters. Thus, whenever
one does not pay, the others suffer as well from the consequences of electricity cuts. Electricity
cutoffs are very frequent and take place for several reasons, including maintenance problems and
delay in paying the electricity bills. There are categories for electric transformers among which
the pricing of electricity is determined; an agricultural transformer moḥūl zera‘ee is cheaper than
a trade transformer moḥūl togāri. To request an agricultural transformer, one must have
documents that prove their ownership over the land or a building license in a land which is
assigned for agricultural reclamation. Another way to get electricity, which is common among
low-income houses, is illegally connecting a cable between the house and a nearby electricity
column and requesting a “practice system” nezam momarsa, which allows settlers to legalize
“electricity theft.” The settlers on a “practice system” pay a fixed amount of money depending
on their patterns of electric power consumption, which is determined by an official who must
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evaluate it beforehand. The arrangements that settlers make to get an access to electric power and
the way in which they pay the bills are carried out collectively.
The valuation of the lands, was to be set according to land use, thus settlers started to rent
their lands to local cultivators, the attempts to cultivate the land, have led to various disputes
over water supply that was now diverted from old lands to the new cultivators. “Everyone is
trying to cultivate their lands now to legalize their land acquisition, and Baza is doubling the
water prices,”
Conclusion
This chapter examines the history of Ard Baza through explore physical constructions
and contractual agreements as two representations of ownership, also as tools that shape Ard
Baza as a social space. In this context, I delve into the limitations of social interactions through
segregation and exclusivity; I argue that such segregation is deeply rooted in the modern
conceptualization of private property as an exclusive right to the owner, such exclusivity of
spaces is analysed in both legal and sociological scholarship from different viewpoints, while a
debate on the nature of private property still occupies much of the legal debates,245 a growing
body of literature on public spaces and urban segregation analyses such exclusivity as a product
of neoliberal practices that commodifies securitization and segregation of spaces e.g. gated
communities.246 In the following chapter, I situate myself within a web of social and power
relations that take various forms in Ard Baza, following a methodological track that combines
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discourse analysis, self-reflexivity to analyze the dynamics of the
spatial configurations of social relations.

Fig. 3.4

The first picture shows the name of a
landowner on a forged gate "owned
by Mohamed Hasssan."
The second picture shows the
boundaries of a settler's property,
drawn by the settler on the margin of
his contract.
Finally, an abandoned building
occupied by Bedouins.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Dispossession and Narratives of Ownership
On the 22nd of May 2016, we- my family, I, and other settlers- who were concerned about
the rumors of a possible execution of a demolition order against Ard Baza decided to visit the
Presidential Office for Receiving Disposability and Legalization Requests, located at the
Presidential Building for Citizens` Services. It was the first time for us to meet with our
neighbors, about thirty pupils and two lawyers including our lawyer. We arrived at the
Presidential building and at the officers at the gate asked for our national IDs and a few minutes
later they sent a car to take only women to the location where we were going to meet an
authoritative figure in the committee. Men were supposed to follow, however, they were not
allowed in. We, about ten women, occupants and owners` agents, wukala, were led into a small
air-conditioned waiting room. All of them were anxious, and discussed issues of ownership,
“we`ve been deceived, by the dishonest alleged landowner” said a woman, and others agreed.
About half an hour later, the committee`s consultant secretary, A. G., entered the room
and announced that we- women in the room- are required to write a draft for each of our cases
including; the price we paid for the piece of land we claim, the area we occupy, the nature of
land-use, then, “you`ll be allowed to briefly introduce your case to Emad Beih” he stated, “aren`t
you going to let our men in?” said a woman, “it`s already crowded in here and all you need to do
is fill up a paper with your cases, they needn’t come” he replied. One of the women was a lawyer
so she volunteered to write a collective request drafting the cases of all the pupils in the room,
however, they started to disagree on whether they should identify themselves as occupants or
landholders, especially since there was a group who had already gone through the process of
legalizing the land and refused to be considered as occupants. Finally, they divided into two
70

groups and wrote two collective requests for each group. Then started to rehearse how they are
going to present the cases to Emad Beih.
“Only two at a time” A. G. said and started to call two by two to meet with Emad Beih.
As we approached him, he greeted us from across the room, he said politely but impatiently
“please state your case briefly, because I still need to meet with the rest of the settlers,” my
mother started to explain that we`ve bought the land from the alleged landowner S. B. and that
the GARPAD terminated his contract after he sold the land to us; “that still doesn`t entitle you
for land ownership” he said. He added, “I really want to help you, and we will try our best to
settle this peacefully if you cooperated because for the state you`re unauthorized land
occupants.” We all left knowing that another representative will visit us at the settlement the
following Sunday, to just brief us with the reconciliation, musalha, procedures according to our
cases. The settlers all exchanged numbers and agreed to meet the representative at a small shop
owned by one of the settlers, they also decided to meet earlier that Sunday to prepare and
organize their legal documents.
On the 29th we were expecting a representative from Mehleb’s committee. Around 12
noon, we received a call from our neighbor stating that the representative had arrived at his shop,
and around fifty of the settlers gathered in a small unoccupied land just next to his shop. When
we arrived, the representative was there and settlers have gathered around him, he pointed out
that our contracts are fraudulent and landholding is not authorized by the government. He also
pointed out that the state will take over the lands and demolish unauthorized buildings of those
who do not reconcile. The settlers were advised to (1) pay an amount of money to the ‘People’s
Right’ account number; (2) file a police report against Baza; (3) send the files to the ‘People’s
Right’ Committee at the Presidential headquarter.
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Personal Networks and Encounters
Following the 2011 revolution, my parents moved to Ard Baza. Like many other settlers
and plot-holders in Ard Baza, my parents originally bought the land in 1998 to establish a postretirement farming project, they started to build and cultivate the land in 2002 and resettled ten
years later. Throughout my five years in Ard Baza I have established only a few relationships
with other settlers and plot-holders, as illustrated earlier, one must imagine Ard Baza as a cluster
of gated individual households, where minimal social interactions take place only in managing
common resources, such as water and electricity, social networks are also established around the
recruitment of agricultural labour, where settlers establish relations with guards who help settlers
and plot-owners recruit daily wage labour, also, a small mosque that my father built near our
house where people gather on Friday prayers. Few individuals have established a network of
relations, namely Baza and his two sons, a settler who owns a shop near the gate of Ard Baza,
and a geologist who help other settlers maintain the efficiency of the existing underground wells.
Thus, my first encounter upon other settlers and plot-owners in Ard Baza followed the
demolition event. One of my main participants is my family’s driver who lives few meters away
from us. In the following part, I sketch my encounters with fifteen research participants and map
eleven individual cases (some interviewed participants are in the same household). It is important
to note that I have changed some of my participants’ names upon their request to keep their
identities secret. Before getting into my qualitative analysis, I will illustrate the individual cases
of eleven of my participants.247
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Individual Cases
Case One ‘I’ve Put All My Life Savings in this Land’
Ahmed, a 59 years old man who has been living in Ard Baza since 2014 with his wife,
son, and daughter after finding a job as a driver with one of the other settlers of Ard Baza. He
bought 1000 square-meter plot from Baza in 2003 to establish a food security project, he built a
family house on 120 square-meter and a livestock shelter on another 70 square-meter, however,
due to financial difficulties he stopped building the family house and resided in the livestock
shelter which he divided into four main rooms; three small rooms to his family members and
another room for raising domestic birds, he used the remaining land around his house as a
household garden where he cultivates crops for domestic use. His son also works as a cashier at
an oil station across the road. Born in Sohag, he moved to the city upon his marriage then moved
to Saudi Arabia where he worked as a bus driver for a pilgrim transportation company while his
family lived in Maadi for more than thirty years. Upon his early retirement in 2009, he put his
retirement pension into Ard Baza in the aim of creating his own project, in an interview with
Ahmed, he explained “I know I should have checked the contracts before putting all my life
savings in this piece of land, but I was too excited to start my own project and at that time the
government encouraged people to move into the desert.” The following is a part of Ahmed’s life
history:
I used to live in Basateen, Maadi before I moved here with my wife and children.
Without a doubt, this small desert land is my true home. I’ve always wanted to move out
of the village, also I`ve never enjoyed living in the city. Here, I have a small villa, my
garden, and space where I can enjoy my cup of tea in the fresh air. No pollution, no noise
and no waga` demag, trouble. I was very proud when my daughter`s husband proposed,
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he knows her father`s house is a decent and nice house . . . Without a doubt, this small
desert land is my true home . . . I’ve always wanted to move out of the village, also I`ve
never enjoyed living in the city, here, I have a small house, garden, and space where I can
enjoy a cup of tea in the fresh air. . . No pollution, no noise and no waga` demag, trouble
. . . I was very proud when my daughter`s husband proposed, he knows her father`s house
is a decent and nice house.
Case Two ‘I Own Two Houses in the City, But I Want to Resettle Here When I Retire’
I met Hussein, a 55 years-old man, at Ahmed’s house. Hussein works as a Financial
Manager at a commercial bank in Cairo, he bought a 3000 square-meter piece of land Baza’s son
in 2007 to build a house where he and his wife planned to resettle in after his retirement. Hussein
built his house on 180 square-meter plot in five years, “to build this house, I used to save an
amount of money every month to build a part, I did that every six months,” “I wanted to raise
and sell guard dogs, but I couldn’t find anyone who would take care of them while I am not
there.”
Case Three ‘This Land used to be a Heaven, but now it Turned into Hell’
Zeinab, 63 years old woman, bought a 1500 square-meter land from Baza in 2007 upon a
referral from Hussein, who worked with her at the same bank then, “Hussein knew I was
interested in buying a piece of land for my two girls, so he introduced me and my late husband to
Baza.” Zeinab bought the plot of land for 225,000 Egyptian pounds and built a 200 square-meter
two-story house, and a small room for a farm worker. Zeinab started cultivating the land
surrounding her house, however, after a disagreement with Baza over water prices he stopped
supplying her with water resulting in the loss of 100 Mango trees that she has planted around her
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house, “I tried to dig my own underground well and paid 30,000 pounds, but the water quality
was very bad, and not proper for cultivation.” Zeinab explains that the lack of adequate water
and electric supply forced her to abandon the land.
Case Four ‘I Built a Small Community Out of Nothing’
Fatma, a 78 years old woman, bought three feddans for herself, son, and daughter for
50,000 Egyptian Pounds Each. She built a 120 square-meter house, 70 square-meter house for a
farmer, several white-bricked livestock shelters, and dug an artificial fishing lake, “I built a
house for me and one for my son who lives in America hoping that he would retire in Egypt and
live next to his brother and sister. . . my oldest son, a geologist, bought four feddans from Baza
and he suggested that I buy three feddans for me and my other two children so that we can all
live together in the future.” Fatma built a 180 square-meter for her son, and was planning to
create an organic farming project, she explains:
My father owned one-hundred feddans in Hawamdiya, near Giza, and owned several
factories in Cairo. . . .in 1961 Abdel-Nasser nationalized most of our property and my
father could not earn a living, so as the oldest daughter I started a small farming project
and raised livestock on a small piece of land that was not nationalized, this was too
humiliating then, but now times have changed . . . We trusted Abd- El Nasser, my father
used to say it was just the right time for a new government. First, Nasser gave us the
impression that he will support the industrial sector, my father, and his family-owned
companies and factories, but one day we received a letter, ‘in the name of the people’
they say, calling upon us to give away our lands and companies. They offered my father a
managerial position in his own company for a salary of 60 pounds per month, but of

75

course, he refused. We were impoverished, and now as we have abandoned the city,
resorted to the desert, they still want to take away our lands .
Fatma currently resides with her daughter and son-in-law who have been managing and
cultivating the three feddans since 2002.
Case Five ‘We Spent Years Reclaiming this Land, and Now the State Wants it’
Fatma’s daughter, Sara, 51 years old woman, built a house on 200 square-meter and a
small white-bricked house for a farmer. She started an organic food project in 2015, she states:
Cultivating the desert takes a long time and tremendous effort. . . I’ve started cultivating
the lands in the year 2000, two years after my mother bought the three feddans for me
and my brother. . . we hired an agricultural engineer who used to work at the American
University’s Desert Development Centre, who leveled the land and help us install a drip
irrigation system. . . I started cultivating more trees after I learned that cultivating my
piece of land can help me accelerate the legalization process.
Throughout the last six years, Sara has built small rooms with primitive materials to raise
livestock. Her husband, Youssef, a 56 years old man, on the other side, have been working on the
legalization process since 2012, in an interview with him he states:
When my mother-in-law bought the land, we thought we would only use it as an
agricultural project, however, after spending too much time building the house we
decided to move there permanently. First, it was hard for me to travel every day to Cairo
to get to work but I’ve gotten used to it and can’t imagine living anywhere else now . . .
could not work on the legalization process herself, so I held the responsibility for
registering the three feddans.
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Case Six ‘We Thought we were Just Doing Business with the State’
Mourad, a 29-year-old man, inherited four feddans from his father at Ard Baza. His
father, Fatma’s oldest son, was a geologist who worked at Sadat City, Mourad established an
office at Ard Baza for groundwater management. His father built a 280 square-meter villa, a 100
square-meter factory and warehouse for underground water drilling equipment on the first two
feddans, four meters away from the service road, and a 280 square-meter mall on the other two,
which is located directly on the service road. In an interview with Mourad he explains:
We lived in Sadat City for years, and we owned real estate there, but we had some
problems with Sadat City Authority so we decided to buy a piece of land in Ard Baza. . .
We knew Baza as an officer at Sadat City Authority, he had a very good reputation and
people trusted him, so we bought the four feddans from him without double checking,
however, I think he is a victim of bureaucratic corruption because he bought the lands,
and who could know better than him, as a state officer, he’s an insider to the entire
process, or at least that’s what we thought, we thought we were doing business with the
state.
Mourad started a commercial vegetables production project in 2015 with the aim of legalizing
the land.
Case Seven ‘We Bought the Land to Start a Family Business’
Mona, a 55 years old woman, bought one feddān for 65,000 Egyptian Pounds in 1999 to
establish a food security project. She and her husband bought the land after returning from the
Gulf to establish their own family project, Baza rented the land to a man who built two shops
100 square-meter each and sold agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.). “my son is an
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agricultural engineer, so I thought he might as well use a part of the land to cultivate the land and
sell our products,” states Mona. However, a few months after buying the land Mona could not
secure an adequate water and electricity supply to start her project and rented the land and two
shops to a car mechanic, “we tried to take water from Baza, but it was too expensive and we
don’t have the money to dig our own underground well.
Case Eight ‘They Say People’s Right, we are the People’
Nabil, a 54 years old man, bought 3000 square-meters with his wife and sister (1000
square-meter each) to raise and sell livestock. Nabil works in Hurghada airport and lives
between Hurghada and Cairo “my retirement income won’t exceed 1000 Egyptian Pounds a
month, I had to establish my own project, and my wife and sister wanted to invest their
inheritance money in small desert lands in their own names . . . but we built our houses
together” explained Nabil. Nabil’s family bought the lands in 2001, for 35,000 each (a sum
of 105,000), he started a poultry raising project with his wife and sister but lost a lot of
money due to the difficulty of accessing local markets (in Wadi el Natrun and Sadat City).
After two years of losses, Nabil suspended the project, “I still go every other weekend, I will
keep trying because this is my only hope to earn a living after retirement . . . We planted
diverse types of trees and bought the seedlings from the Ministry of Agriculture. 500
seedlings and my neighbor make sure the land is irrigated every other day.”
Case Nine ‘How Can We Reclaim the Land with no Adequate Water Resource’
I met Wafaa, a 53 years old woman, at Hadayek El-Kobba Tax Office where she works,
Wafaa’s husband and two brothers bought an area of 3000 square meters in 2003 to establish a
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food security project. They built two separate rest-houses 100 square-meter each, a room for a
guard, and a shelter to raise poultry, Wafaa explains:
I remember in the 70s and 80s food security projects were the biggest trend, the
government used to encourage people to establish such projects due to solve the food
insecurity problem . . . It was not a wise decision to start this project, there are no clinics
or veterinarians in the area, so much of our chicken died and we ended up dismissing the
whole idea . . . we are now trying to cultivate the land, but Baza controls this too and
keeps raising the water price every year.
Case Ten ‘I am Cultivating my Brother’s Land to Help Him Register it”
Bassem’s brother, Kareem, lives in America and bought the land from Baza upon a
referral from Fatma’s oldest son. Kareem bought one feddān in the year 2000 for 35,000
Egyptian Pounds, however, he claims to have paid more, he started building a 200 square-meter
house shortly after he bought the land, however, the building process took more than ten years.
In a phone interview that I conducted with Kareem, he explains that:
I hired many contractors and they were all corrupt, the house coasted me a fortune and I
haven’t finished it yet . . . my brother has been managing the land for the last year, but
with the insufficiency of water supply the cultivation process is not going as well as I
hoped would be . . . I tried to dig my own well but it takes a lot of bureaucratic
procedures to get a license and since they treat us as squatters our land documents do not
entitle us of license to dig a well, nor to apply for other services (electricity and water) . .
. I think the government can easily bring this area to life if it provided such basic services
or else they should just stop encouraging people to invest in desert reclamation.
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The cultural significance of land in Egypt emerges from a history of feudalism where
owning lands bestowed power and social supremacy,248 the above-mentioned representations of
land shows that participants’ representations of land ownership varies from one person to the
other, some settlers portrayed land ownership as a source of social capital, others only focused
on land as a commodity. It also reveals a socioeconomic dimension that is understated in
scholarship, the problem of retirement.
Registering a Desert Land
In Dead Capital and the Poor in Egypt, Hernando de Soto asserts that “to formally
acquire a parcel on state-owned desert land . . . it requires the individual to carry out 77
bureaucratic procedures in some 31-different public and private offices.”249 In August 2016,
People’s Right Committee transferred the case of Baza to the Public Funds Investigation police
for illegally seizing state lands, an area of 215 feddans west of the desert road, and selling these
lands to the current settlers and plot-holders under fraudulent contracts.250 Upon their meeting
with the Committee’s Representative, they were advised to include the following in the
reconciliation applications to the committee (1) a copy of their contracts; (2) a map from the
Egyptian Survey Authority; (3) a police record māhdār against the landowner/broker; (4) a bank
receipt with the amount of money that each individual puts in the account of the People’s Right
Committee. Instead of applying collectively, settlers insisted on applying their cases separately.
Although the Committee promised settlers to start the registration process in a period of four
months, a year later the settlers and plot-owners of Ard Baza were surprised to learn that their
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cases were transferred to Wadi el Natrun City Council under Behira Governorate, and once again
settlers were compelled to reapply their cases to the City Council.
Conclusion
On 30 June 2017, a resident of Ard Baza notified me that the cases of the settlers have
been sent to Wadi El-Natrun City Council, among other wad ‘yadd cases upon a Presidential
Decree that assigned Governorates to carry out the registration process in cooperation with the
‘People’s Rights’ Committee to retrieve ‘stolen state lands’. Puzzled by the news, some of the
settlers who have participated in my field study called me under the indication that I might have
some expertise in the issue to ask what to do now? The reason for their puzzlement emerged
from a deep fear of the switch to mahaliyat local administrative units which are known to be
involved in several corruption and bribery lawsuits, another predicament was the reason behind
transferring their cases again, especially after the Committee promised that they would start the
registration process earlier in 2016.
After checking with the Committee’s Secretary A. G., he explained that the Committee
have sent the names and files of those who have applied for reconciliation with the state,
stressing that the Committee is currently coordinating with governorates and the GARPAD. A
group of settlers agreed to go to Wadi el Natrun City Council together, and there they those
whose applications that have been accepted by the Committee and the GARPAD will be notified
upon the arrival of a list with their names from the Committee’s office, a week later a list with
sixty-four names have arrived, most of which are settlers who have used the lands for
commercial and residential purposes. However, after few talks with public officers at the City
Council they declared that none of the files have arrived from the Committee and advised settlers
to once again apply their applications to the Wadi el-Natrun City Council, a process which costs
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from 2500 Egyptian Pounds and carrying out procedures such as the measurement of the land,
and acquiring maps from the ESA. Following the acceptance of the applications, the City
Council in cooperation with other gehat welaya are to form a valuation committee to set a price
which the settlers have to pay in a period of three years. As the tension and anxiousness heighten
in the settlement, few among the low-income settlers decided to demolish their own houses.
When I asked one of my research participants, Ahmed, on the reason behind his decision he
simply answered, “it’s better for me to demolish my own house, rather than watching them do
it.” Instead triggering collective action against the transferral decision, this event triggered a
great sense of bitterness and injustice, especially among those who have cultivated their lands
and also those who have carried out more serious legal procedures than others, one told me in a
casual conversation he says, “ it’s unfair that they treat us equally to those who have abandoned
their lands, I don’t know why does our government fight those who actually reclaim the land
instead of fighting those who exploit it for revenue.”
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion
On 18 May 2017, Sout El Omma Newspaper, publishes an article under the title of
“Fourteen steps to Legalize wad ‘yadd Lands,” including (1) complying to the regulations that set
the limit of desert land ownership to 100 feddans; (2) given that the land has been occupied and
seized before the 31 December 2006; (3) map the land; (4) file an application to the GARPAD;
(4) pay the land price that the GARPAD sets (in the case of inability to pay the full price, the
applicant can pay 25% and divide the rest on four-year instalments); (5) after which the
GARPAD issues a primary contract and starts another process to formally register the land and
issue a final contract.251 In the case of Ard Baza, as well as other desert settlements, residents and
buyers have already acquired primary contracts, which means that they will be forced to go
through an entire process to acquire an unregistered/ informal piece of document that will neither
grant them tenure security or end their precarious situation. Meanwhile, more lands are being
allocated to individuals under ambiguous and precarious contractual agreements.
A Policy Mess: Chaos or ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’?
While the Egyptian government has attempted to empower the peasants in the 1950s and
60s through the implementation of the two agrarian reform bills in 1952 and 1961, the reforms
were both flawed and short-lived; only few of the landless peasants that have acquired lands
under the first two reforms were granted final sales contracts, where the state still maintained its
monopoly over the lands and right of disposition. The history of Egypt’s property system has
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been occupied by inconsistent policies that reflect on broader economic and policy-making
reality.
This study reflects on the legal dilemma of desert land acquisition, a dimension that adds
up to the desert mess, the question here is whether this mess is a product of understudied policy
reforms, or is an organized strategy for accumulation by dispossession? To answer this question,
I have examined the case of Ard Baza to analyze the social reaction to the ‘People’s Right’
campaign and an emerging narrative on state ownership. The portrayal of the lands in both
official narratives and local narratives, reflect on two distinct conceptions of ownership. The
‘People’s Right’ campaign, like many other land reforms that have served short-lived political
and institutional interests, is portraying the retrieval of state lands to the public as panacea while
mystifying the main root of the problem, which is much related to the incomprehensiveness of
the rules that govern individuals’ access to desert / state lands. Another aspect of the problem is
represented in the category of private state’s property. Debs posits that state property (public
property) as excerpted from the French Civil Code refers to the state as a “trustees of public
interest,”252another excerption that is employed in Egypt’s property law is extracted from the
Islamic Hanafi doctrine, entitles the state of full ownership over specific types of lands, e.g.
mūwāt lands.253 However, at the present time the state’s unlimited right to dispose of lands,
namely desert lands, poses a multi-dimensional challenge, one that hinders both security of
tenure and shrinks public space.
The Egyptian military’s monopoly over decision making concerning the dispossession of
state lands, according to Law 143 of 1981, is another aspect of the problem. Robert Mason,
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delves into the dynamics of the military economy given the very few resources available on
military involvement in the formal economy, he posits that “the constitution [also] omits any
reference to civilian oversight of the armed forces, in general, or regarding specific economic
activities such as selling land and assets.”254 In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and F. Engels
state that “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of
private property.”255 This study argues that both private property and state property are two sides
of the same coin, thus if we followed Marx’s line of reasoning, one would also call for the
abolition of private state property.
On the 25th of January 2011, the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, settlers of
El-Warraq and Imbaba protested the demolition orders that were issued earlier in 2010 against
informal constructions and buildings on state lands as a part of North Giza Development project,
a process that would have caused the eviction of more than 800,000 ‘citizen’ according to a
report by the Land Center for Human Rights.256 In January 2017, an official at Giza governorate
announced that the governorate will precede project implementation,257 the months that followed
have witnessed the eruption of several conflicts between residents of the two neighborhoods and
police forces. While the cases of El-Warraq and Imbaba represent a different category of state
lands, agricultural lands inside of governorates administrative borders, the cases drawn the local
and international attention to current state practices regarding its’ lands, one can say that these
practices have gained visibility through conflicts with settlers in El-Warraq and Imbaba.
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Resistance and Law
Latour examines power as a cause of collective action, “what makes the notion of power
both so useful and so empty is a philosophical argument about the nature of collective action”258
in this context, instead of examining power relations, Latour suggests examining collective
action, e.g. the execution of a leader’s commands. On the other hand, Harvey examines the role
of social movements and collective resistance in facilitating the access to the ‘urban process’
which in my understanding comes to represent the right to space and resources, in this
framework, while Harvey portrays the right of inclusion and the reconstruction of space as a
result of collective resistance, Latour explores the dynamics of the collective and how it
organizes and forms its’ networks and actions. By applying methodological insights from
Latour’s actor-network theory to the case of Ard Baza I have noticed that residents have
developed minor networks around resources and contracts, the absence of common spaces as
well, have jeopardized collective action, such hypothesis was reemphasized during and in the
preceding of the demolition incident. In this framework, I ask, what are the alternatives to
collective resistance? Another, more broader question would be what is the future of social
movements? In times where social collective action is rapidly shrinking, and where elements of
contestation between members of the same community is deeply rooted.
Harvey highlights the role of ‘insurgent movements’ in resisting accumulation by
dispossession, he notes that movements, such as peasant movements, have grown and played a
key role during the 1980s.259 One movement that Harvey did not point to is a movement that was
organized by several legal scholars at Harvard Law School during the 80s and 90s and that
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resulted in the production of a new body of knowledge under the umbrella of what came to be
known as Critical Legal Studies.260The movement started out as a pedagogical movement in the
U.S.A, and North Europe that challenges dominant legal norms, and it was both criticized by
right, as well as left scholars, however, the movement identifies itself as one that is premised on
classical Marxism theory and a movement of the ‘legal left.’ One of the main critiques of critical
legal theory is that it still is confined to law as a tool for governance, driven by a rationale that
rejects the legal construct altogether.261 In “The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies”
Duncan Kennedy states “the right to critique, like Critical Legal Studies in general, operates at
the juncture of two distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting enterprises,
which I will call the left and the modernist/ post-modernist projects,”262 Kennedy’s theoretical
insights on property law, works on the borders of the legal discourse. The study’s main thesis is
that rights are both conceptualized in legal as well as in cultural terms, the movement criticizes
the attempts of some scholars in the political left to deconstruct legal concepts, such as rights, to
the point where the concepts loses their meanings and thus the power for inspiring collective
resistance. According to Jarna Petman “what is needed, on the left, is awareness that rights alone
can mean anything and that when embedded in a particular institutional context such as the
European Court of Human Rights (and there are always some institutional context), they come to
mean whatever the policy of the institution is.” 263
Finally, I would like to highlight a point that I aim to develop in future studies, in
incidents such as the demolition of buildings either at Warraq, Ard Baza, or even in the cases of
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the murder of revolutionist and political activist, most social movements turn to the legal
documents as tools for resistance and fighting unjust situations, a growing body of left
scholarship have been calling for the abandonment of legal reasoning altogether, however, new
ideas in the legal left, namely Harvard’s Unbound Journal, a platform for a growing legal left
open venues to new legal reform and legal resistance, the journal, as well as the movement,
integrate sociological and legal insights to study different aspects of laws and social conceptions
of rights. On this note, I would like to conclude with a note from Daniel Hourigan’s “PostModern Anarchy in the Modern Legal Psyche Law, Anarchy and Psychoanalytic Philosophy,”
“in the new commons, we do not escape law; rather, law once again becomes a fiction of the
shared social world.”264
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GLOSSARY
ʿAdād )(عداد

Counter

Ard )(ارض

Land

ʾAmlāk ʾamiriyāh )(أمالك اميرية

State domain

Beih )(بيه

A Turkish word and a title of honor

El ʿard lemān yazrʿhā)(األرض لمن يزرعها

Land to the tiller

Ḥokoum )(حكومة

The government

Feddān )(فدان

A unit of land measurement (one feddan is equal
to 1.038 acres)

Ǧehāt elwelāyāh )(جهات الوالية

State institutions or authorities to which state
lands are allocated

Ḥaq elshāʿb )(حق الشعب

People’s right

Infitāḥ )(إنفتاح

Open Door Policy

Intifa ‘ )(إنتفاع

Gaining usufruct rights over a land, it is also
used to refer to beneficiaries of the Agrarian
Reform

Intifādāt el felā ḥeen )(إنتفاضة الفالحين

Peasants’ uprising

Iḏ ‘an )(إذعان

Submission. Iḏ‘an contracts are agreements
between the state and individuals where the
latter comply with the terms and conditions of
the state

ʿIẓba )(عزبة

Estate

Ǧabal el ḥekd )(جبل الحقد

A term that was used by Egypt’s President
Anwar El-Sadat that refers to class envy

Kbīr )(كبير

An elder also used to refer to a leader
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Māhdār)(محضر

A police record

Moḥūl zera‘ee )(محول زراعى

Electric transformer used in agricultural
activities

Moḥūl togāry )(محول تجارى

Electric transformer used in commercial
activities

M ūwāt/ mubāh )(موات\مباح

Refers to unoccupied wastelands that either fall
under the public domain, or is appropriated for
individual occupancy through Wad ‘yadd

Nezām momārsāh )(نظام ممارسة

A method to register and legalize access to
public electricity supplies

Šariʿa )(شريعة

Islamic law

‘Urfi or ibtidā’y )(عرفى او إبتدائى

An unregistered contract

Wad ‘yadd )(وضع يد

A customary process through which individuals
occupy empty lands that are not owned by
anybody, excerpted from the Islamic Sharia

Waga ‘demāgh )(وجع دماغ

A headache or inconvenience

Waqf )(وقف

Religious trust lands

Wukalah )(وكلة

Agents

Zimām )(زمام

A registered area
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